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Summary 
The Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) ended on 
December 8th, 2006 with a consensual agreement on a Final Declaration, something the 
BWC regime had not seen since 1996. This document represents a comprehensive and 
thorough review of the BWC. It reaffirms some important understandings, most notably 
the prohibition of biological weapons use and the comprehensive scope of the BWC; it 
also contains an updated reflection on the role of the BWC regarding non-state actors and 
bioterrorism, an increased emphasis on national implementation, and a recognition of 
synergies with international organisations and civil society.  
States parties agreed on several additional measures: they decided on a new 
intersessional process with annual meetings and a work programme for 2007-2010; they 
established a small Implementation Support Unit (ISU) in Geneva that will provide 
administrative support, facilitate communication among states parties and manage the 
confidence-building measures (CBMs); and they decided to promote universality of the 
BWC. The working atmosphere had improved significantly since the previous review 
conference, and there was a willingness to work constructively and pragmatically 
throughout much of the negotiations. Of the two basic conflicts in the regime, the one 
concerning cooperation, technological exchange and export controls permeated the 
negotiations again but did not block consensus in the end. The other one around 
verification and a legally binding document to strengthen the BWC did not come to bear 
directly, as there was a tacit agreement not to include these issues in the negotiations, but 
it was nevertheless palpable in the background. Likewise, general political tensions, 
especially between Iran and the USA, impacted on the deliberations but did not prevent a 
substantive consensual outcome. 
What does this outcome mean for the BWC regime? Is there light at the end of the 
tunnel? Considering the difficult political situation in the regime since 2001, when the 
efforts to strengthen the BWC through a legally binding compliance protocol failed, and 
applying a pragmatic viewpoint, the answer is yes. Viewing the results from a more 
conceptual arms control perspective, however, the assessment must be somewhat more 
sober.  
In the political situation prior to the review conference, the conditions for success were 
far from ideal: Given the desolate state of the regime after 2001, it was no matter of course 
that a meaningful outcome could be achieved at all. But the full review and the new 
understandings contributed to solidifying the regime, and the conference results provide a 
good starting point for pragmatic steps to tackle issues such as national implementation, 
prevention of bioterrorism and misuse of biological agents, awareness-raising, domestic 
preparedness and surveillance of infectious diseases. There was also a sense of activism, 
ownership of the BWC and a convergence of views on some problems that bodes well for 
the new intersessional process and the future work in the regime. However, the focus is 
currently only on one dimension of the BWC regime, namely on problems that affect all 
states parties but that are exogenous to state-to-state relationships.  
II 
If, in a conceptual view, the function of arms control is seen in stabilising inter-state 
relations, preventing armaments, and building confidence between states, the review 
conference was much less successful in these respects. To fulfil this function, there needs 
to be a stable, reliable framework for state interaction with a certain degree of 
predictability and trust in the other parties’ compliant behaviour. But the Final Document 
remains weak on procedural issues, and there could be no agreement on any new binding 
obligations, not even in connection with the intersessional topics. Transparency measures 
like the CBMs could not be significantly improved, and compliance and verification were 
left aside completely. The latter strategy was essential to avoiding exacerbation of the 
tensions and to achieving the above-mentioned successes. Nevertheless it means that a 
whole dimension of the BWC as an arms control instrument is being neglected. 
The assessment of the conference from these two perspectives leads to re-
commendations that reflect the same two-pronged approach. In the current situation, the 
primary focus will be on the work in the new intersessional process. Most of the topics of 
2007 and 2008 – national implementation, biosafety, biosecurity, codes of conduct – were 
already discussed in the last process, so that there is ample material available for 
substantive discussions. All these topics could be translated into action more effectively if 
states parties could agree on a systematic reflection and on introducing binding 
recommendations. If effective follow-up action can be induced, this could address 
important problems and mitigate some of the deficits of the regime as regards 
implementation, preparedness against bioterrorism and prevention of the misuse of 
biotechnology. 
The topics for 2009 – international cooperation, technological exchange and capacity-
building to counter infectious diseases – and 2010 – assistance and preparedness in the 
case of biological weapons use – are new in the intersessional discourse and will require 
thorough preparation. Both contain areas that have long been of concern to developing 
countries in the Non-Aligned Movement. The intersessional meetings will provide an 
important opportunity to discuss the perceived problems and different views around 
technological cooperation and development. Contrary to some concerns expressed during 
the review conference, such a discussion could actually contribute to de-politicising and 
de-ideologising this issue, as it forces states to reflect on and express their expectations, 
define their needs, and recognise what is already being done. If the discussions can be 
conducted as factually and pragmatically as in the last intersessional process, they could 
not only tackle problems of development, public health and disease surveillance, but 
might even contribute to objectifying a long-standing conflict in the regime.  
With a longer-term view to the arms control dimension of inter-state relations, several 
ideas could be considered that go beyond the topics of the intersessionals but are based on 
existing measures and thus do not require new negotiations. States parties could review 
and make use of the consultation procedures under Article V to address not only grave 
compliance concerns, but also other problems. This would provide for an additional 
framework with regular procedures in which states parties can discuss specific problems, 
e.g. issues related to development and technological cooperation, or the CBMs. Collective 
action on CBMs might not be possible until the next review conference, at the earliest, but 
   III 
states parties could individually explore the scope for improvements and increased 
transparency. Moreover, states parties could support the UN’s efforts to strengthen the 
Secretary General’s mechanism to investigate alleged biological or chemical weapons use, 
for example through training sessions for the experts. Especially if combined with 
procedures for assistance, this would enhance the ability of states parties to respond to the 
gravest compliance concerns possible. Finally, making the BWC norms universally 
binding through international customary law could be considered as a parallel strategy to 
universalising treaty membership. This would provide for a more solid normative basis 
for action against proliferators and would enhance the role of the UN Security Council 
and Secretary General in connection with biological weapons proliferation. 
The first set of recommendations could bring real progress in the current situation and 
to the dimension of practical and shared “biological problems”. The second set could pave 
the way for some modest improvements to the arms control dimension of state-to-state 
relations and compliance. While the constant interaction in the regime may contribute to 
improving state relations, this cannot be taken for granted, especially should more 
confrontational situations arise. In the long term, it would therefore be necessary that 
states initiate a new discourse on compliance and verification and consider new 
approaches to these issues, as a return to the protocol approach would be neither feasible 
nor desirable. Until political circumstances allow for this, strengthening the procedures 
available in the BWC right now could mitigate some deficits in the regime. Only if both 
dimensions are addressed – not necessarily in a one-in-all approach, but in the same 
framework of action – will the regime be truly strengthened and the potential of the BWC 
as an arms control instrument and core of the regime be fully exploited.  
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1. Introduction1  
The fear of sickness and death is as old as humankind, and the deliberate use of disease as 
weapon has been morally condemned and outlawed for over a century. With the 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which was concluded in 1972 and entered into 
force in 1975, biological weapons became the first category of weapons to be prohibited 
completely and comprehensively by international law.2 The BWC has 157 member states. 
Every five years, these states hold review conferences that offer the opportunity to review 
the operation of the treaty, to assess its effectiveness, and to agree on additional measures 
to improve biological weapons control. 
In the BWC regime, such improvements are urgently needed. Although biological 
weapons have seldom been used by states or by non-state actors (Wheelis et al. 2006; 
Tucker 2000), several developments and characteristics specific to the biological field 
require close attention and effective control mechanisms.3 There is rapid progress in 
biotechnology and the life sciences, including in genetics, synthetic biology, 
nanotechnology, and other areas.4 Although these developments are primarily intended 
for benign applications in medicine and pharmacology, many of them could be misused 
for malign (weapons) purposes. This reveals a fundamental problem of biological 
weapons control: the dual-use character of many scientific techniques, agents and 
equipment. The same activities or substances can often have (legitimate) civil or defensive 
and (illegitimate) offensive applications, which makes it difficult to distinguish between 
legal and illegal activities and impossible to simply ban certain activities or materials.5 
The dual-use problem is especially grave given that the scientific and technological 
developments could theoretically lead to an increased interest in biological weapons by 
states and non-state actors, as these developments might enhance the weapons’ 
effectiveness and military utility (which to date has been considered low). As for state 
programmes, the BWC permits research and development as long as it serves purely 
defensive purposes. However, due to the dual-use nature of much of this research, its 
purpose can be determined from the outside only under very transparent conditions. In 
the absence of such transparency, especially if others distrust the defensive nature of a 
 
 
1  I would like to thank Giorgio Franceschini, Alexander Kelle, Jez Littlewood, Harald Müller, Tabea Seidler 
and Jonas Wolff for their very helpful comments and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) for 
financial support. Moreover, I am grateful to those who provided important advice and information but 
prefer to remain anonymous. The views expressed in this paper are solely my own views. 
2  The text of the BWC can be found at http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf; 20.06.2007. 
3  For the following cf. Wenger/Wollenmann (2007). 
4  For an overview of relevant developments cf. e.g. Kelle et al. (2006); Wheelis (2002). 
5  The negotiators of the BWC tried to address this problem by inserting the so-called “general purpose 
criterion” in Article I of the treaty: It prohibits any biological agents and toxins “of types and in quantities 
that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” and any equipment 
“designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict”. 
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programme or use this as an excuse for their own activities, the risk of biological 
armaments could be growing in the future. Moreover, if non-state actors with an interest 
in biological weapons gained access to new discoveries, they could abuse them e.g. to carry 
out bioterrorist attacks. Large-scale and mass casualty attacks with biological weapons are 
technologically demanding and require resources that are hardly available outside state-
run programmes; they may hence not be very likely.6 But even small-scale attacks like the 
Anthrax letters in the USA in autumn 2001 could have enormous psychological and 
economic effects. The BWC is binding only upon states and not upon non-state actors, 
but if implemented fully, it can provide useful tools for countering bioterrorism. A strong 
BWC regime can thus more effectively prevent state and non-state actors from acquiring 
biological weapons. 
However, the existing deficits of the BWC regime – including in the areas of 
compliance, verification, transparency, and national implementation – render the control 
of biological weapons less effective than it could and should be (chapter 2). Review 
conferences provide opportunities to initiate steps to strengthen the regime, but any 
attempts to mitigate the current deficits have to take place in a difficult political context, 
as they have to cope with general political tensions and with long-standing conflicts in the 
regime (chapters 2.2.2 and 3).  
Despite these political difficulties, the 6th review conference of the BWC ended on 
December 8th, 2006 with agreement on a Final Declaration, something the BWC regime 
had not seen since 1996. The Final Document contained not only a full article-by-article 
review of the convention, but also several additional agreements and understandings 
intended to strengthen the convention (chapter 4). The full review is generally deemed a 
success, but while some consider the outcome an important step forward and out of a 
“metaphorical valley” (Littlewood 2007: 15), others stress its limited nature and the fact 
that crucial problems of the regime such as verification, transparency in biodefence, and 
scientific and technological developments remain untackled (CNS 2007).7 Assessing the 
outcome from two angles, this PRIF Report argues that both judgements are justified: 
Considering the difficult political context of the “post-protocol” regime since 2001 
(chapter 3.1), the conference was certainly successful, as it paved the way for further steps 
towards better implementation and a more stable regime. However, viewing the regime 
from a conceptual arms control point of view, the assessment must be more sober, as the 
crucial deficits could not be addressed. Following the same two-pronged perspective, 
recommendations are made in chapter 5 with regard to the immediate outcome of the 
review conference, but also – based on the arms control concept as discussed in chapter 2 
– with a look beyond it.  
 
 
6  For an assessment of biological weapons and bioterrorism threats cf. e.g. Leitenberg (2005). 
7  Cf. for conference analyses CNS (2007); Fox (2006); Guthrie (2007); Meier (2007); Khan (2007); 
Littlewood (2007); Pearson (2006b, 2007); Sims (2007). 
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2. Biological Arms Control 
2.1 Arms Control as a Concept 
Arms control theory as conceptualised after the end of World War II has three main 
objectives: reducing the risk of (nuclear) war by increasing stability and preventing arms 
races, reducing the costs of armaments, and limiting the damage in the case of war (Bull 
1961; Schelling/Halperin 1985). Initially aimed at stabilising the relations between the 
USA and the Soviet Union, the concept has come to be understood as encompassing 
various measures aimed at limiting or reducing levels of armaments, restricting or 
preventing proliferation, building confidence, and increasing transparency.8 Arms control 
hence includes measures designed to control the means of warfare and increase stability.  
Past experience and conceptual considerations suggests that to reach this objective, 
arms control measures should ideally  
• be reciprocal and non-discriminatory,  
• include legally and/or politically binding measures and treaties in which agreed 
norms and principles are codified and which allow to distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate behaviour,  
• be in accordance with international law, 
• provide ways to determine (non-)compliance with the agreed measures, 
• create a framework of rules and procedures which provide a certain degree of 
predictability.  
Confidence-building plays a central role in this, as it is both a precondition and an 
objective of arms control.9 Other preconditions, which are interlinked with confidence-
building and mutually reinforcing, are transparency, verification, regular and regulated 
dialogue as well as stable communication channels between states. Measures that meet the 
above criteria form a complex web of political and diplomatic means to create and 
maintain stability. Moreover, continuous cooperation in international institutions and 
regimes can contribute to transforming state relations – to the positive, if confidence-
building works and transparency helps create trust; to the negative, if distrust remains and 
if rules are perceived to be broken or applied in a discriminatory way. Viewing arms 
control from this angle illustrates that these measures are not an end in itself, but that they 
serve a certain purpose. Stable inter-state relations can be created in various ways, but a 
certain degree of reliability and predictability is necessary in any international 
environment that has no overarching authority and in which the perception of other 
states’ actions often influences a state’s own reactions. 
 
 
8  Croft (1996); Goldblat (2002); cf. Burns (1993: 1ff.) for the relation between arms control and 
disarmament. 
9  For a critical view on this “paradox of arms control” cf. Gray (1992) (later qualified in Gray (2003)). 
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Arms control has its merits in any multilateral context and with regard to any category 
of weapons that is perceived as a (potential) threat. The connection between transparency, 
confidence-building, predictability and stability is well established, and there is no reason 
to assume that this has changed after the end of the Cold War. It is hence argued that 
international arms control regimes, if effective, serve an important purpose in fostering 
international peace and security regardless of their systemic context.  
Of course, (perceived) changes in the security environment and in the international 
system may require adaptations of arms control measures to specific regional contexts, to 
non-state threats and/or to technological developments. However, the underlying 
objectives remain relevant, as relative stability, even if it existed today, cannot be taken for 
granted but needs to be continually maintained and reconstructed. An ideal-type model 
of arms control would thus encompass agreements that are legally binding, codify 
principles and norms, and allow to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate behaviour. 
They would also contain measures to verify compliance and sanction non-compliance, 
and to enhance transparency and confidence among states parties. In sum, they would 
provide a certain degree of predictability for those involved, which excludes measures 
perceived as arbitrary or discriminatory.  
2.2 Biological Arms Control and the BWC Regime 
2.2.1 Strengths and Deficits of the Regime 
An analysis of the current biological weapons regime on the basis of these conceptual 
considerations would have to conclude that, while possessing some strengths, it is far 
from meeting this ideal (cf. Kelle 2003). Together with the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which 
prohibits the (first) use of biological, chemical and toxin weapons in warfare, the BWC 
forms the core of the biological weapons regime; in combination, the treaties provide a 
comprehensive legal framework and strong norms against these weapons.10 States parties 
have repeatedly attempted to develop the regime further, and it has proved sufficiently 
dynamic to incorporate new measures and approaches, as is visible for instance from 
recent initiatives to prevent illegitimate access to pathogens and to improve public health 
and international cooperation. Yet, the regime also suffers from several shortcomings. 
The BWC lacks measures to check and monitor compliance with the treaty. Efforts to 
remedy this deficit through a legally binding compliance protocol to the BWC failed in 
2001 (see chapter 3.1). The BWC’s existing compliance mechanisms are weak and only 
include consultations among states parties on problems arising in connection with the 
convention (Article V) as well as the possibility to request the UN Security Council to deal 
with suspected treaty violations (Article VI). Even though Russia/the Soviet Union, South 
Africa and Iraq (then a BWC signatory) are known to have violated the BWC (Wheelis et 
al. 2006), and even though the USA has repeatedly accused other treaty members of 
 
 
10  For a critical view cf. Smithson (2004). 
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breaching the convention11, Article VI has never been invoked. One reason may be that 
involving the Security Council represents a grave step with potentially severe 
consequences, and states might be wary of such a strong action or fearful of reciprocal 
accusations. However, with suspected or alleged cases of non-compliance pronounced but 
not effectively addressed, confidence in the convention could be eroding.  
One mechanism available to states parties and to the Security Council in this context is 
the UN Secretary General’s mechanism, initiated in 1982 and elaborated in 1987, to 
investigate the alleged use of biological, chemical and toxin weapons.12 The Secretary 
General could carry out such investigations if requested by UN members, the General 
Assembly, the Security Council, or on his/her own account. Several alleged chemical 
weapons and toxin uses were investigated between 1982 and 1992, but the mechanism was 
never applied to biological weapons. It is not institutionalised but relies on experts and 
equipment provided ad hoc by UN members. Until recently, the lists of experts and 
laboratories to be used in an investigation were outdated, but attempts to update them 
were initiated in 2002 by the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA, since 
March 2007 UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, ODA) and again through the UN 
General Assembly’s Counterterrorism Strategy in 2006.13 Probably owing to the new 
terrorism connection and maybe also due to a stronger awareness among BWC members, 
there seems to be a greater interest and willingness now to provide information, and the 
update process is apparently making good progress. In addition, UN ODA is reviewing 
the investigation guidelines and procedures. Nevertheless, the mechanism is but a virtual 
one, and its links with the BWC regime remain weak, as it is primarily related to the 1925 
Geneva Protocol and several BWC members oppose tying it more strongly to the BWC. 
In order to mitigate the compliance and transparency deficit, a system of confidence-
building measures (CBMs) was set up in 1986 and elaborated in 1991 (cf. e.g. 
Chevrier/Hunger 2000; Isla 2007). These politically binding measures require states to 
annually submit information to DDA/ODA on research facilities of very high biosafety 
standards and on biodefence research, on outbreaks of infectious diseases, on relevant 
scientific publications, on the promotion of scientific contacts, on legislation and 
regulations related to the BWC, on former offensive programmes, and on vaccine 
production facilities.14 The CBMs currently represent the only means available to states 
parties to enhance transparency and confidence in each others’ compliance. However, 
participation has been poor – with an all-time high of 56 submissions in 200615 – and has 
 
 
11  E.g. in US Department of State: Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments, August 2005: 17ff. 
(http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/51977.htm; 20.06.2007). 
12  UNGA Resolutions A/37/98 D (1982); A/42/37 C (1987); cf. Littlewood (2006); Tucker/Zilinskas (2002); 
Woodward (2004). 
13  A/RES/60/288 (2006) (http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.html; 20.06.2007). 
14  BWC/CONF.III/23 Part II (Annex). 
15  An overview over CBM participation since 1988 is available at http://www.unog.ch; 20.06.2007. 
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therefore not yielded the expected results. Rather, CBMs remain another area in which 
action is urgently needed. 
The BWC also suffers from a lack of organisational support (Sims 2006a; Sims/Pearson 
2005; Findlay/Woodward 2004). International treaty organisations can provide logistic 
support to meetings, serve as communication channels and clearinghouses for 
information exchange, and allow for more regular and regularised interaction. The BWC 
has no such organisation and, until recently, even lacked any permanent institutional 
support. An organisational structure would also be important to monitor and effectively 
deal with the scientific and technological developments in fields related to the BWC, 
which are currently not being addressed adequately. 
Up until recently, the obligation to nationally implement the BWC was neglected by a 
number of states parties (Woodward 2003), and there is still not enough pressure or 
incentive for states to fully implement the BWC.16 This means that in many states there 
were (or still are) no – or no systematic and effective – national legislation and regulations 
to criminalise biological weapons-related activities and to prevent illegitimate access to 
dangerous materials, nor for procedures regarding CBM submission, cooperation under 
Article V and VI, or assistance under Article VII in case of biological weapons use. 
Judged by the criteria of effective arms control listed above, the regime lacks several of 
the crucial elements, namely trust in other states’ compliance (due to deficient 
implementation, a lack of verification, and a lack of transparency), and effective ways to 
deal with cases of suspected treaty violations. While there are still no institutionalised 
communication channels, either, the constant interaction in the intersessional process 
2003-2005 has facilitated better communication among states parties. Nevertheless, for 
BWC members the lack of binding and well-developed procedures means a lack of 
predictability and potentially a perceived risk of falling victim to arbitrary action and 
accusations. Hence, the potential of the BWC to counter state and non-state threats and 
to deal with scientific developments is not fully exploited. Despite the strong norms, there 
is thus urgent need for action, but any attempts to mitigate the deficits and to strengthen 
the regime face a difficult political context.  
2.2.2 Political Conflicts in the BWC Regime 
The members of the BWC regime are organised in three regional groups: The Group of 
Western and Other States (Western Group/WEOG), the Group of Non-Aligned and 
Other States (NAM), and the Group of Eastern European States (Eastern Group). This 
structure is based on political and socio-economic as well as geographic dimensions: it 
dates back to the Cold War with its two blocs and the non-aligned movement, and the 
WEOG and NAM largely consist of industrialised and developing countries, respectively. 
 
 
16  Information on national legislation related to the BWC is available at http://www.vertic.org/datasets/ 
bwlegislation.html and http://disarmament.un.org/Committee1540/list-legdb.html; 20.06.2007. 
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In addition to general political differences, two BWC-specific conflicts permeate the 
negotiations even in seemingly unrelated areas and impact on the dynamics in the regime: 
the conflict between technological cooperation/development and export controls as well 
as around a compliance protocol to the BWC and, more broadly, verification. As regards 
the former, Article X of the BWC provides for cooperation and technological exchange in 
the peaceful use of the biosciences. It potentially conflicts with Article III that requires the 
prevention of biological weapons proliferation, which may include export controls and 
restrictions on transfers. NAM states have repeatedly complained that export controls are 
being applied by industrialised states in a way that inhibits technological exchange and 
development, while WEOG members have emphasised that export controls are part of 
Article III implementation. This creates constant (latent or open) tensions in the regime. 
Whereas NAM states often stress that the BWC contains “regulatory” (security) as well as 
“promotional” (cooperation/development) aspects, Western delegations hold the security 
aspects far more important and often reject proposals aimed at strengthening the 
“promotional” side. Interestingly, both sides have now adopted a similar rhetoric calling 
for a “balanced approach” and for viewing the BWC as a “composite whole” without 
singling out certain articles, with the NAM pressing for more attention to Article X and 
the Western states trying to prevent exactly that.  
The second major conflict developed around the issue of verification and a legally 
binding document to strengthen the BWC. In 1994, BWC members mandated the Ad 
Hoc Group (AHG), a negotiation forum open to all interested parties, to negotiate a 
compliance protocol to the BWC, but the approach foundered on US opposition in 
2001.17 In keeping with its current attitude towards arms control, the USA still rejects any 
kind of binding measures or institutionalisation as well as anything else that could 
possibly lead to a BWC protocol. Verification had initially been a Western (though not 
US) preoccupation, and NAM states like China, India, Iran and Pakistan, as well as 
Russia, were reluctant to accept intrusive verification and inspection measures 
(Littlewood 2005: 98f, 227). Since 2001, however, the rhetoric, though probably not the 
basic attitude, has changed considerably. In the wake of continuing US opposition, 
verification has become a (rhetorical) priority for the NAM and Russia. The 
uncompromising US position allowed these states to hide behind it and safely and 
vigorously call for the protocol’s conclusion and implementation. At the same time, many 
Western states that remain committed to verification in the long term have rhetorically all 
but abandoned the subject to avoid alienating the USA. Instead, they have settled for a 
more limited and pragmatic approach that accommodates US interests and focuses on 
other aspects of the BWC.  
 
 
17  The US argued that the BWC was not verifiable, that a protocol would lull states parties into a false sense 
of security while providing cover for treaty violators, that the provisions would jeopardise commercial 
interests and compromise US national security by yielding too much information about biodefence 
activities. Cf. e.g. Bailey (2002); Roberts (2003); Rosenberg (2001); cf. also Ward (2004); cf. more 
generally e.g. Chevrier (2001); Dando (2002); Kervers (2002, 2003); Littlewood (2005); Rissanen (2001). 
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3.  The Biological Weapons Regime Prior to the 6th Review 
Conference 
3.1 The 5th Review Conference in 2001 and 2002 
The failure of the protocol negotiations in July 2001 and the way it came about left the 
BWC and the regime in a deep crisis (Brugger 2002; Lennane 2006). At the 5th review 
conference in 2001, disagreement could be expected along the “traditional” conflict lines – 
compliance, export controls, and scientific and technological exchange and cooperation – 
anyway.18 In addition, the USA dealt a near-fatal blow to the conference with a proposal to 
terminate the AHG mandate. This surprised even the US’s closest allies and provoked 
strong reactions from most delegations, including Western states. In order to avoid a 
complete failure of the conference, the president suspended it for one year to allow for a 
cool-off period and to gain time to explore possible alternative approaches.  
After the events of 2001, relations between the WEOG and the NAM remained 
antagonistic and had soured even within the WEOG (Brugger 2002) when the 5th review 
conference resumed work in November 2002.19 In order to maintain some kind of 
multilateral discussion in this very tense situation, a proposal for annual meetings had 
been worked out and consulted on and was presented by the conference president as a 
“take it or leave it”-package on the first day. This proposal, apparently tailored to win US 
tolerance, provided for annual meetings of experts and states parties between 2003 and 
2005 on five narrowly defined topics. They resembled topics proposed by the USA in 2001 
as an alternative to the compliance protocol.20 States parties were to “discuss, and promote 
common understanding and effective action” on national implementation of the BWC, 
national mechanisms to ensure security and oversight of pathogens and toxins, 
international capabilities to deal with cases of alleged biological weapons use, national and 
international mechanisms to combat infectious diseases, and codes of conducts for 
scientists. There was no negotiation or decision-making mandate.21 
Consultations during the conference were held informally, behind closed doors or in 
the regional groups only. For the WEOG and Eastern European states, the proposal 
presented an acceptable, though not necessarily for all desirable, interim solution, given 
that complete failure seemed to be the only alternative. Within the NAM, however, there 
was a strong reluctance to accept it as it was, as the work programme was perceived to 
follow US priorities and ignore crucial NAM interests, and there was a high degree of 
 
 
18  For accounts of the conference proceedings cf. e.g. Brugger (2002); Rissanen (2002); Zanders et al. (2002). 
19  For accounts of the resumed session cf. e.g. Chevrier (2002/2003); Hart et al. (2003); Meier (2002); 
Pearson (2002); cf. also Sims (2003). 
20  White House, ‘Strengthening the international regime against biological weapons’, Statement by President 
George Bush, 01.11.2001 (http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2001/7907.htm; 20.06.2007). 
21  BWC/CONF.V/17: 3-4. 
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frustration at the way it was imposed upon the states parties. Consensus could be secured 
in the end despite the very tense atmosphere, but it took a lot of diplomatic effort to 
persuade key NAM states to agree to the chair’s proposal and at the same time keep the 
US on board. 
3.2 The Intersessional Process 2003 – 200522 
Initial assessments of the new process varied between scepticism because the topics did 
not address the fundamental problems of the regime (e.g. Meier 2002), and cautious 
optimism that there might be “much more to the new process than might first appear” 
(Littlewood 2003: 63). Western states mostly defended the outcome as “the best we could 
get”, but some also expressed dissatisfaction at the format of the process. The like-
minded, more radical NAM members remained sceptical of its utility.  
Contrary to the rather low expectations, the expert meetings were conducted in a 
constructive and productive way. Participants appreciated the opportunity to exchange 
views and information, to clarify concepts such as biosafety and biosecurity23 (Guthrie et 
al. 2004) and to bring in stakeholders who had previously not been adequately involved 
(e.g. from academia, industry and international organisations). As these meetings served 
the sole purpose of facilitating such exchanges and compile factual reports, and as many 
delegations brought in technical experts with no “diplomatic baggage”, there were no 
tensions comparable to those at the 5th review conference. 
However, the meetings of states parties with their more political (and politicised) 
atmosphere revealed that these old tensions still lingered. Despite the constructive expert 
discussions, states parties could not produce tangible results or distil any “best practices” 
or recommendations out of the plethora of information gathered, but in each final report 
could merely “agree on the value of” certain measures and principles discussed during the 
sessions.24 The lines of argumentation exposed the degree to which the protocol still 
divided states parties and remained the focal point of the BWC regime, and more than 
once, behind-the-scenes diplomatic interaction was necessary to secure consensus. At the 
same time, the process “gradually cooled the political temperature” (Khan 2007: 13), and 
it seems plausible to assume that the mere exchange of views and continuous interaction 
contributed much to the changed atmosphere that struck many observers as a surprise in 
2006 and that was far from obvious only months before the conference started.  
 
 
22  For descriptions and assessments of the whole process and the individual meetings cf. e.g. Guthrie et al. 
(2004; 2006); Littlewood (2003); Meier (2002); Pearson (2003a, b, 2004a, b, 2005a, b); Tucker (2004). 
23  Biosafety means protecting against the accidental release of pathogens or other laboratory accidents, 
whereas biosecurity refers to protection against theft or illegitimate access. These concepts initially caused 
tensions for political reasons, since some perceived a new bias towards security measures, but also for 
linguistic reasons, since many languages simply do not distinguish between safety and security. 
24  BWC/MSP/2003/4; BWC/MSP/2004/3; BWC/MSP/2005/3 (http://www.opbw.org; 20.06.2007). 
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3.3 Preparations for the Conference: Developments in 2006 
3.3.1 Early Preparations 
Whereas the 6th review conference hovered in the background of all BWC meetings since 
2001, the 2005 meeting of states parties marked the onset of more concrete proposals and 
ideas. Officially, the topic was codes of conduct, but several states seized the opportunity 
to present their views and priorities for the 2006 conference.25 At the same time, it was 
uncertain whether the Preparatory Committee in April 2006 would even be able to agree 
on the duration of the conference – 2 or 3 weeks – and on an agenda.  
Over the course of 2006, several track-two meetings were held to facilitate dialogue 
among states parties and to sound where there might be room for agreement and 
progress. Some meetings apparently facilitated identification of those issues that were 
likely to figure prominently in the review conference discussions: universality, the 
outcome of the first intersessional process, a new intersessional process, implementation 
support for the BWC, the CBMs, ways to deal with scientific and technological 
developments, verification, and the relationship between bioterrorism and the BWC 
(Geneva Forum 2006; Tokyo Seminar 2006). However, it seems there were still diverging 
views on the relevance, prioritisation and acceptability of some of these measures.  
3.3.2 EU Joint Action, Action Plan and Common Position 
In February 2006, the European Union (EU) agreed on a Joint Action and an Action 
Plan.26 The Joint Action aims at encouraging ratification of or accession to the BWC to 
promote its universality, and at supporting its national implementation in EU countries. 
Implementation of the Joint Action was commissioned to the BioWeapons Prevention 
Project (BWPP), an international network of NGOs committed to strengthening the 
BWC. The Action Plan obligates EU members to annually submit their CBM declarations 
and, by the end of 2006, provide the UN Secretary General with updated lists of experts 
and laboratories to be used in an investigation of alleged biological weapons use; this 
information is to be updated every two years. For 2006, both objectives were achieved. 
 
 
 
25  Cf. the statements of Canada, Germany, India, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (on behalf 
of the EU); all available at http://www.opbw.org; 20.06.2007. 
26  “Council Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP of 27 February 2006 in support of the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention, in the framework of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction”, Official Journal of the European Union, 7.3.2006, L 65/51-55; “EU Action Plan on 
biological and toxin weapons, complementary to EU Joint Action in support of the BWC”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, 9.3.2006, C 57/1-2 (http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/Harvard-
Sussex-Program-The-EU-and-WMD.htm; 20.06.2007). 
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In March 2006, the EU agreed its Common Position for the review conference.27 It 
reveals that the EU remains committed, at least nominally, to achieving verification 
measures for the BWC “in the longer term”. Concrete objectives of the EU as listed in the 
document include promotion of, inter alia, a further intersessional process for 2007-2010 
with specific work areas, universality of the BWC, full compliance with and effective 
implementation of the BWC, improvements to the CBM process, and further action on 
the work of the 2003-2005 meetings.  
3.3.3 The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom)28 
In April 2006, BWC states parties convened for the PrepCom to agree on an agenda and 
elect the officials for the conference. While some suggested that the PrepCom also discuss 
substantive issues29, there was a general realisation that it should restrict itself to 
procedural discussions lest agreement on the agenda would be jeopardised.  
Most agenda items could be taken from previous agendas and were agreed easily, but 
one problem remained: The USA was adamantly opposed to any reference to the AHG, to 
the 2001 review conference or to any mention of verification or a BWC protocol (Ruppe 
2006), but the NAM, and most prominently Iran, insisted on an agenda that at least kept 
the possibility open to include these topics in the deliberations (cf. Borrie 2006: 20; 
Nguyen 2006). Agreement was finally possible on a compromise formula that 
accommodated both positions.30  
Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan, who chaired the PrepCom, held most 
negotiations in the plenary and not in the regional groups as was done during the 2002 
session of the 5th review conference (Borrie 2006: 20; Pearson 2006a), thereby creating a 
much more transparent setting. The PrepCom showed that apparently all states, including 
Iran and the USA, were unwilling to block the proceedings at this early stage (Nguyen 
2006). However, once the discussion turned to substantive issues, there was clearly still 
much scope for disagreement and conflict. 
Non-governmental experts described the PrepCom as successful mainly because states 
agreed on an agenda, but expectations for the review conference remained mixed (CNS 
2007; Schneidmiller 2006). Over the summer of 2006, however, there were indications for 
progress and converging positions, which later that year gave rise to more (yet cautiously) 
optimistic outlooks (Borrie 2006; Lennane 2006; Meier 2006). 
 
 
27  “Council Common Position 2006/242/CFSP of 20 March 2006 relating to the 2006 Review Conference of 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)”, Official Journal of the European Union, 
25.3.2006, L 88/65-67 (http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/Harvard-Sussex-Program-The-EU-and-
WMD.htm; 20.06.2007). 
28  For reports of the PrepCom cf. Nguyen (2006); Pearson (2006a). 
29  Canada introduced a paper entitled “Towards the Sixth BTWC Review Conference: An Accountability 
Framework”, which was based on a non-paper circulated in 2005 and contained proposals for national 
implementation, CBMs, implementation support and annual meetings (BWC/CONF.VI/PC/INF.1). 
30  Agenda item 11, BWC/CONF.VI/PC.2: 7. 
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3.3.4 Setting the Stage for the 6th Review Conference 
The EU, a group of 12 Latin American states31, and the JACKSNNZ group32 published 
working papers well before the conference began, and Canada re-submitted its 
“Accountability Framework” as a working paper also in advance.33 All these working 
papers touched upon issues that had been discussed prior to the conference. 
Canada EU JACKSNNZ Latin American States 
 Biosafety & biosecurity 
(Germany) 
  
National 
implementation 
Assessment of nat. imple-
mentation (Germany) 
Review of national 
implementation (Japan) 
 
CBMs CBMs (France) CBMs (Switzerland) CBMs  
 Article X (Finland)  Article X 
 Universality (Italy) Universalisation (Australia) 
Universality (South Korea) 
Universalisation  
Implementation 
support 
Implementation support 
(Netherlands) 
Implementation Support 
Unit (Norway) 
Implementation Support 
Unit 
Annual 
meetings 
Intersessional process  
I &II (France, UK) 
Intersessional process (New 
Zealand) 
Follow-up mechanism 
Table 1: Topics of working papers published prior to the review conference 
The single group papers built upon and referred to one another, which demonstrated 
their interconnectedness – e.g. as regards an Implementation Support Unit (ISU), 
universalisation, CBMs and national implementation – and reinforced the claims for the 
single proposals. Moreover, they showed that sub-groupings existed in the NAM and in 
the WEOG that were willing to put forward pragmatic proposals and to engage 
constructively. This raised hopes that the more radical positions within these groups 
would be more easily exposed and would have greater difficulties rallying group support 
and solidarity than had been the case at previous conferences (Meier 2006). Finally, the 
papers revealed a broad middle ground across all regional groups; after all, 55 states 
aligned themselves with the working papers.34 However, some of the key players, namely 
the USA, Russia and China and several other NAM states, did not make their positions 
known in advance, and since all decisions at review conferences are made by consensus, 
there was still uncertainty as to what exactly the conference would be able to achieve. 
 
 
31  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru 
and Uruguay. 
32  This is an acronym for a group of seven “non-nuclear, non-EU” Western states, namely Japan, Australia, 
Canada, South Korea, Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand. 
33  BWC/CONF.VI/WP.1- 19. All working papers are available at http://www.opbw.org and 
http://www.bwpp.org (20.06.2007).  
34  In addition to the (then) 25 EU members, 8 (then) acceding, candidate and potential candidate countries 
plus Ukraine and Moldova aligned themselves with the EU statements and working papers. 
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4. The 6th BWC Review Conference in 200635 
4.1 Organisation of the Conference 
Similar to previous BWC review conferences, the 6th review conference was organised in 
different formats: Only the formal plenaries are open to NGO observers; they are mostly 
used for the opening and closing of the conference and for the General Debate. The actual 
negotiations are held in the Committee of the Whole, in informal plenaries and in the 
Drafting Committee (which did not meet in 2006). All formats except for the Credentials 
Committee are open to all states parties and are usually attended by the same delegates. 
While the president chairs the plenaries, representatives of the other two regional groups 
preside over the Committees. Chairs traditionally rotate among the regional groups. 
The issues mentioned most frequently in the General Debate were those already 
discussed at earlier meetings, namely (in the order of frequency) universalisation, a new 
intersessional process, CBMs, verification, national implementation, the intersessional 
process 2003-2005, cooperation and development, and bioterrorism and biological 
threats.36 NGOs, international organisations, academic institutions and scientific 
associations also made statements to the plenary and organised a number of lunchtime 
seminars for conference participants. These seminars provided additional room for 
information exchange and discussion.37 
Ambassador Khan received much credit for the success of the conference (CNS 2007; 
Guthrie 2007: 23; Meier 2007: 29; Pearson 2006b: 35). Throughout the meetings, he 
maintained a very transparent approach and forced states to openly and publicly voice 
their objections in the plenary. He pushed for a high negotiation speed, managed to 
largely avoid a “split along regional group lines” (Khan 2007: 14), and his style of 
chairmanship was generally praised as highly efficient and effective. 
4.2 The Regional Groups: Eastern Group, WEOG and NAM 
Even though the traditional group structure was maintained and remained palpable in the 
discussions, it seemed less vital than before. The Eastern Group was hardly visible as an 
actor at all. The WEOG also met less frequently than during previous sessions and did not 
 
 
35 For analyses of and comments on the review conference, cf. also e.g. Fidler (2007); Guthrie (2007); 
Littlewood (2007); Meier (2007); Pearson (2006b, 2007); Sims (2007). 
36  Verification and Article X were mentioned most frequently by NAM states, whereas support for a new 
intersessional process and a CBM review was highest in the WEOG. Most statements are available at 
http://www.bwpp.org; 20.06.2007; for summaries cf. Pearson (2006b). 
37  For a summary of all statements by NGOs and international organisations, cf. Pearson (2006b). All 
statements are available at www.bwpp.org. For a list of the side events cf. Guthrie (2007: 28). 
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issue any joint statements or papers. Rather, three distinct actors – the EU, the 
JACKSNNZ, and the USA – were discernible within the group (Meier 2006: 36).  
The increasingly intensive EU coordination leaves little leeway to deviate from 
previously agreed EU positions in favour of common Western positions (unless agreed in 
a separate EU coordination, which always precedes WEOG consultations). Since the EU 
enlargement in 2004, there has been a significant overlap in membership between the 
Western and Eastern groups through the EU, which also impacts on group coordination. 
For the EU, the interest in pushing through its priorities as stated in the Common 
Position at times clashed with the principled aim of facilitating (or at least not blocking) 
consensus. Despite its very thorough and useful preparations, and although individual 
members made important contributions throughout the conference, the EU’s role during 
the conference was not as significant as it could have been, as the high negotiations speed 
made effective coordination difficult. 
With the JACKSNNZ, a new grouping appeared in the BWC context, though it had 
operated in the nuclear non-proliferation regime before. The group informally consulted 
on a number of working papers prior to the review conference, and members loosely 
coordinated their work also during the conference. The proposals themselves were 
proactive and not radically different from some of the EU ideas, albeit more progressive 
and further reaching in some respects.  
Since the EU and the JACKSNNZ aimed to actively support the BWC and facilitate 
consensus, the USA, which since 2001 has maintained by far the most restrictive positions 
with the WEOG, was left more isolated within the group at this conference than before. Its 
“red lines” appeared to have changed marginally (e.g. as regards the ISU) in line with the 
US’s recent slightly more favourable attitude towards multilateralism (Sims 2007: 367; 
Findlay 2006: 14), but still seemed stricter and narrower than most others’. However, 
within these red lines, there was a greater willingness to be flexible, engaged and 
constructive (cf. CNS 2007; Guthrie 2007: 23). Part of the reason may have been that after 
the review conferences of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2005 and the 
UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons in 2006, the USA did not wish 
to take the blame for wrecking yet another arms control conference. Moreover, the US 
assessment of the BWC’s utility in general and particularly in the fight against 
bioterrorism seems slightly changed. However, discussion of binding measures – 
verification or other – and any permanent institutionalisation remained impossible. 
The NAM was the only group to issue joint papers and statements, but coordination of 
its positions seemed difficult (Guthrie 2007: 24; Pearson 2006b: 35), and even though 
development and cooperation remained clear priorities of the group, the spectrum of 
opinions within the group was broader than before. The group of 12 Latin American 
states presented positions not unlike some of the EU’s and JACKSNNZ’s, and far from 
those of the more radical NAM members.  
The group of like-minded NAM states that had advocated strong positions at previous 
meetings – for example Cuba, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia and Pakistan – seemed not 
as united this time. In part, this may have been due to idiosyncratic motifs: With a 
Light at the End of the Tunnel? 15
 
 
conference president from Pakistan, the Pakistani delegation maintained a relatively low 
profile and was more constructive, possibly in order not to hinder success for the 
President. Cuba, in its capacity as NAM coordinator, acted more constructively, too. India 
had apparently reviewed some of its more radical demands from previous meetings and 
followed a less confrontational course vis-à-vis the WEOG, which might have been 
influenced by its increased (economic) cooperation with the USA and others. The more 
constructive attitude of the USA as well as of these NAM states may also have triggered a 
kind of virtuous circle of cooperation. 
Several general factors may have contributed to this change, too: UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540 obligates all states to introduce export control legislation.38 Hence, no 
state can claim anymore that export regulations represent an illegitimate measure, and the 
debate around Article III, while still being fought out, was indeed more moderate than on 
previous occasions. Given the rapid growth of biotechnology in states like India, Cuba 
and Indonesia, these states may have realised that they could find themselves in a donor 
position rather than at the receiving end of technological cooperation. Finally, it can be 
assumed that the intensive exchange of views during the first intersessional process, in 
addition to objectifying the debate, may have led many states to realise the value of the 
BWC and the measures discussed in 2003-2005. All these new developments left Iran, the 
most hard-line of the NAM countries, isolated on many points (CNS 2007), and despite 
its antagonism to the USA, even Iran made some concessions in the end (Khan 2007: 15). 
4.3 Negotiating and Agreeing the Final Document: Final Declaration and 
“Decisions and Recommendations” 
4.3.1 The Final Declaration: Article-by-Article Review of the BWC 39 
The negotiations on the Final Declaration produced the “concise and accessible document” 
President Khan had called for in his opening statement.40 Given the apparent tacit 
agreement not to mention the 2001 draft Final Document, the Final Declaration of 1996 
served as the main point of reference for the article-by-article review. Recourse to its 
language often provided a way out of potential deadlock situations, as this was “previously 
agreed language” and as such had to be acceptable to all. The review was facilitated by a 
reader compiled by NGOs, which contained the previous Final Documents from all 
review conferences and additional sources such as resolutions and CBM forms, and which 
 
 
38  Resolution 1540 was agreed in 2004 and extended through Resolution 1673 in 2006. It obligates UN 
members to take measures, including national legislation and export controls, to prevent non-state actors’ 
access to nuclear, biological and chemical materials that could be used as weapons, and to report to the 
1540 Committee (http://disarmament.un.org/Committee1540/index.html; 20.06.2006). 
39  The language proposals submitted by states parties for the single articles are collated in BWC/CONF.VI/3 
(Annex II). 
40  Opening Statement by the President of the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons 
Convention, Ambassador Masood Khan (Pakistan), Geneva, 20 November 2006. 
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put all delegations on an equal footing as far as the ability to follow discussions and 
compare language proposals was concerned.41 Yet, delegations did not opt for the easy way 
to copy “old language”; instead, they put this language under scrutiny, removed 
ambiguities, deleted redundancies or mere repetitions of BWC text, and added new 
understandings (cf. Pearson 2006b: 24-28; Sims 2007: 359-362). 
It was remarkable that except for the most controversial issues like, for instance, 
verification and technological cooperation, there was a willingness to show flexibility, 
make concessions (within the respective national red lines) and engage in constructive 
discussions. On several issues, there was a convergence of opinions. The tone was mostly 
moderate and collegial, even among states that had previously shown different attitudes. 
However, the negotiations also saw some bargaining in the form of “package deals” and 
tit-for-tat strategies, especially in the endgame between the US and Iran (Guthrie 2007: 
18; Meier 2006). Resolving the last outstanding issues between these two countries 
required intense mediation by the president, but in the end both states “graciously and 
prudently accommodated each other’s positions” (Khan 2007: 15). 
The Final Declaration comprises a Solemn Declaration, which reaffirms several 
principles that apply to the convention as a whole, and the article-by-article review, which 
contains common understandings and interpretations of all BWC articles.42 The Solemn 
Declaration underlines the value of the BWC and of universalising it, and it reaffirms the 
scope of Article I (including the effective prohibition of biological weapons use) and 
Article X. It refers to (non-)compliance43, condemns all forms of terrorism and reiterates 
the importance of preventing terrorist access to biological weapons. Moreover, the 
contribution of Resolution 1540 to the purposes of the BWC is acknowledged, though this 
required an intense debate. Another passage, most likely resulting from the intersessional 
discussions, recognises the importance of raising public awareness and of collaborating 
with relevant international organisations. The major problem was the reference to 
previous review conferences, which almost became the stumbling block for consensus.44  
Of the 15 BWC articles, five required little or no debate at all: Article II (destruction or 
conversion of biological weapons stocks or facilities), Article VIII (continued validity of 
the Geneva Protocol), Article XIII (treaty duration and withdrawal procedure), Article 
XIV (depositaries, ratification/accession procedure) and Article XV (authentic texts) were 
 
 
41  Briefing Book, BWC Sixth Review Conference 2006, prepared by the British American Security 
Information Council (BASIC), the Harvard Sussex Program (HSP) and the Verification Research, 
Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), October 2006. 
42  BWC/CONF.VI/6 (http://www.bwpp.org/6RevCon/documents/2006126thRevConfinal.pdf; 20.06.2007). 
43  It appears problematic that states agreed that the use of biological weapons “by anyone at any time” would 
pose “fundamental challenges to the Convention’s viability”. After all, not the use as such, but rather the 
inability of states parties to effectively respond to such use would threaten the BWC’s viability. 
44  As the 1996 Solemn Declaration referred to the AHG and to verification, a direct quote of this document 
was unacceptable for the United States (Meier 2007: 27), but a matter of priority for Iran. The problem 
was solved by recourse to language taken directly from the agenda. 
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taken almost word for word from the 1996 Final Declaration; apart from some editorial 
suggestions or clarifications, there was no debate.  
Regarding Article I, which contains the basic prohibitions of the treaty, there was 
unanimous consent to reaffirm that the use of biological weapons, which is not explicitly 
mentioned in the BWC, is “effectively prohibited by the Convention”. Moreover, there was 
consensus on the scope of the BWC prohibitions; it unequivocally covers any biological 
agent or toxin and all actual and potential scientific developments that are or could 
become relevant to the convention. The only dispute in this section was about the 
question whether or not to include a list of scientific fields relevant to the BWC, and if yes, 
which fields should be included. In the end, those prevailed who argued that inclusion of 
such a list could undermine the comprehensive scope of the convention, especially given 
the rapid and unpredictable scientific developments, and inadvertently create the 
impression of limiting the number of relevant fields. Deletion of the list rendered the 
Final Declaration with the broadest possible coverage of “all scientific and technological 
developments in the life sciences and in other fields of science relevant to the Convention”. 
There were intense discussions about Article III which relates to the non-proliferation 
of biological weapons. This debate was heavily influenced by the old controversy of 
industrialised and developing countries about export controls. Yet, several of the conflicts 
could be resolved in a relatively cooperative way, either because states made concessions 
or accepted compromise proposals, or else because contested passages became part of 
“package deals”. The explicit inclusion of “national export controls” is an indicator for the 
converging views on this subject (see chapter 4.2; cf. also Sims 2007: 360). As a new 
element and a visible result of the intersessional process 2003-2005, this section also refers 
to biosafety and biosecurity. 
Article IV contains the requirement for states parties to enact national measures to 
implement the convention. The pertinent section in the Final Declaration explicitly 
includes penal legislation and elaborates on important elements, including topics of the 
first intersessional process such as biosafety, biosecurity, codes of conduct and disease 
surveillance. There was a debate about the exact relationship between Resolution 1540 
and the BWC; states parties had different views on which of the two takes precedence over 
the other. In the end, the reference to Resolution 1540 remained in the text, but it is 
phrased in a way that does not detract from the primary authority of the BWC.  
Article V provides states parties with a consultation mechanism for “any problems 
which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the 
Convention”. Procedures for consultative meetings were elaborated at the 2nd and 3rd 
review conference in 1986 and 1991.45 In 2006, states parties reaffirmed the validity of 
these procedures but did not discuss their content or situations in which such meetings 
may be convened. With regard to CBMs, some Western countries argued for strong 
 
 
45  BWC/CONF.II/13/II: 5-7; BWC/CONF.III/23 (Part II). 
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language pointing to the poor participation, whereas some NAM countries insisted on 
softer language that would acknowledge technical difficulties.46 The current compromise 
formula is weaker than the Western proposals were, but still stronger than in 1996.  
According to Article VI, states parties can request the UN Security Council to 
investigate any case of suspected violation of the convention. The current text that invites 
the Security Council inter alia to consider requesting the UN Secretary General to carry 
out an investigation (see chapter 2.2.1) was largely uncontroversial. A controversy 
developed around a second reference to the Secretary General’s investigation mechanism, 
which encouraged the Secretary General to review and update it. While a number of 
(mainly Western) states, especially Germany and the United Kingdom (cf. CNS 2007)47, 
favoured strengthening the mechanism and linking it more closely to the BWC regime, 
several states were reluctant or unwilling to refer to the mechanism in the BWC 
framework at all, as in their view this might either lead to verification of the BWC 
(Findlay 2006: 20) or else might distract from exactly this approach. In the end, states 
parties, as in 2004, simply acknowledged the mechanism’s existence and noted the 2006 
UN Counterterrorism Strategy which contains a request for updates.48  
Article VII entitles states parties to assistance if biological weapons are used against 
them. Discussing detailed procedures for such cases has long been a NAM concern, but 
this issue was also part of the protocol negotiations and thus opened up old wounds. 
Hence, there could be no call on states parties or DDA to take concrete steps to that end. 
The compromise formula notes “the proposal that States Parties may need to discuss the 
detailed procedures for assistance”, and this issue is also contained in the topic for the 2010 
intersessional meetings. States parties undertook to provide assistance to other states 
parties in cases where a state party “has been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of 
the Convention” (which – considering the new understandings – could be read to include 
accidents due to deficient biosafety and biosecurity measures). States parties also 
expressed their willingness to provide assistance in cases where “danger or damage” results 
from biological weapons use by “anyone other than a State Party” (which includes non-
state actors). This novelty extends the scope of Article VII considerably and reflects the 
stronger focus on bioterrorism that was conspicuous throughout the conference.  
It seems odd that the review of Article IX, which calls for negotiations to ban chemical 
weapons, almost blocked the conference; after all, the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC) has been in force for 10 years. The controversy did not develop around the CWC 
 
 
46  Analyses of the CBM participation by region can be found in Hunger/Isla (2006) and in the French 
working paper (BWC/CONF.VI/WP.4). They show that there is a considerably lower level of participation 
in regions consisting mainly of NAM countries. 
47  Germany and the UK submitted working papers on this subject to the 2004 Meeting of States Parties 
(BWC/MSP/2004/MX/WP.10 (Germany); BWC/MSP/2004/MX/WP.56 (UK)), as did South Africa 
(BWC/MSP/2004/MX/WP.15); Germany also prepared a working paper on this subject for the 2006 
conference (BWC/CONF.VI/WP.36). 
48  For the 2004 text cf. BWC/MSP/2004/3: 5; for the UN Counterterrorism Strategy cf. fn. 13. 
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as such (whose value was unanimously reaffirmed), but around the question whether and 
how the BWC review conference could legitimately comment on and call for compliance 
with the CWC. Underlying this is the debate in the CWC regime about the 2012 deadline 
for chemical weapons destruction: It is widely considered unlikely that the USA and 
Russia will meet the deadline, which could be interpreted as a violation of their CWC 
obligations (cf. Harrington 2007: 30). The proposal can thus be seen as a political side 
blow directed mainly at the US which had openly accused Iran of violating the BWC in 
the General Debate. In Geneva, the situation could be cleared, but reportedly the issue was 
taken to the CWC Conference of States Parties that met in The Hague at the same time. 
Article X stipulates that BWC parties should facilitate and be able to participate in the 
exchange of biological equipment, material and know-how intended for peaceful 
purposes, that they should promote the development and application of biosciences, and 
that implementation of the BWC must not hamper economic and technological 
development or the international exchange of the above items. The negotiations were 
heavily loaded with the political baggage of the traditional conflict between the NAM and 
the WEOG. Consequently, even though some very basic common ground existed (Khan 
2007: 14), there was major redrafting and bargaining right until the end (Guthrie 2007: 
18). It was conspicuous, however, that some NAM countries that had previously been 
very outspoken on development issues kept a lower profile or even acted as mediators in 
some instances (see also chapter 4.2). 
In relation with Article XI (amendment of the BWC), Iran informed the conference 
that it had again, as in 1996, formally proposed amendment of the convention to include 
“use” in the title and in Article I. The Iranian delegation insisted that this be reflected in 
the review of Article XI, but other states objected with the argument that amendment 
proposals were entirely a matter for the depositaries and a special or amendment 
conference of states parties. In the end, delegations agreed to take note of the Iranian 
proposal and to invite all states parties to “convey their views to the Depositaries on the 
proposal”.49 
All Final Declarations have reaffirmed under Article XII that review conferences 
should be held every five years. The decision to hold the 7th review conference “in Geneva 
not later than 2011” was uncontroversial. Controversial, but agreed in the end, was the 
decision to include “scientific and technological developments”, “progress of implementation 
of obligations under the BWC”, and “implementation of the decisions and recommendations 
agreed upon at the 6th review conference” as specific tasks for this conference.  
 
 
49  The consultation process is still ongoing. However, since many delegations (including many NAM 
members) already rejected the idea of an amendment during the review conference (Guthrie 2007: 20), it 
is unlikely that there will be a majority in favour of any follow-up action. 
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4.3.2 Evaluation of the Article-by-Article Review  
The 2006 Final Declaration represents a comprehensive and thorough review of the BWC; 
it reaffirms some important understandings, most notably the prohibition of use, the 
comprehensive scope and the general purpose criterion, but it also contains an updated 
reflection on the role of the BWC regarding non-state actors and bioterrorism, an 
increased emphasis on national implementation as well as national and international 
preparedness, and a recognition of synergies with international organisations and non-
governmental and civil society actors (cf. also Sims 2007; Guthrie 2007; Pearson 2006b). 
Moreover, understandings on most issues of the first intersessional process are reflected in 
the Final Declaration. Especially considering the mixed expectations prior to the 
conference and the lingering political tensions that were apparent even in the relatively 
collegial atmosphere during the event, this is an important step forward for the regime. 
Unfortunately, the document remains weak on procedural issues under Articles V, VI 
and VII. As for Article V, the validity of the existing procedures was reaffirmed, but there 
was no discussion about their application (or the lack thereof), let alone any elaboration 
or update. Similarly, the complaint procedure under Article VI was not discussed, and 
there is not even a more explicit reference to the single available UN mechanism in this 
context. Article VII will be covered in the intersessional process in 2010, but Articles V 
and VI, the only ones relating to compliance concerns, will remain unattended to at least 
until 2011, which means that some fundamental deficits of the regime still remain. 
4.3.3 “Decisions and Recommendations”: Cross-Cutting Issues 
The “cross-cutting” issues, which were considered important during the review 
conference but did not fit in with the article-by-article review, were discussed separately in 
informal, open-ended consultations. Most of these issues are interlinked: The discussions 
about tasks for the implementation support unit were influenced by those about CBMs, 
universality and national implementation; the same is true for the topics of the new 
intersessional process. 
Intersessional Process 2003-2005 
The first intersessional process 2003-2005, mentioned significantly more often by WEOG 
than by NAM members, was mostly described as useful during the general debate. 
Criticism came from the NAM in its group statement and working paper. Similarly, the 
Latin American states highlighted in their working paper that the intersessional process 
“suffered from limitations as regards the implementation of all the obligations contained in 
the Convention”. New Zealand, on the other hand, emphasised the “constructive role” of 
this first intersessional process in “maintaining momentum on BWC issues between review 
conferences”, but was critical of the fact that the meetings could produce only factual 
reports and suggested “a more formal system of recommendations made on the basis of 
intersessional outcomes”. France and the United Kingdom on behalf of the EU listed 
several actions undertaken in preparation for or in response to the meetings, such as the 
EU survey of national legislation in 2003, the EU Joint Action of 2006, and various 
workshops and seminars. They also pointed out that the process enhanced a sense of 
Light at the End of the Tunnel? 21
 
 
ownership of and responsibility for the convention. Japan and the United States 
submitted working papers in which they reported on their own action taken in response 
to the intersessional meetings.50 
The text to be included in the Final Document was among the least contentious 
elements. A Norwegian draft was amended only once; it reiterates the mandate of the 
process and states that the meetings  
“functioned as an important forum for exchange of national experiences and engendered 
greater common understanding on steps to be taken to further strengthen the 
implementation of the Convention”.  
It further “notes the contribution” by international organisations, scientific and academic 
institutions as well as non-governmental organisations and endorses the outcome 
documents of the meetings of states parties.51  
It is important that all BWC members shared and expressed a positive assessment of 
the intersessional process, and it is valuable to have references to all topics included in the 
(politically binding) Final Declaration. However, states parties did not define specific 
follow-up action and concrete obligations, and the outcomes were not reflected 
systematically, which means that part of the mandate, namely to “take effective action”, 
still depends on the individual states’ initiative only.  
Implementation Support Unit (ISU) 
Delegates and observers have long called for permanent institutional or secretarial 
support in the regime.52 Prior to the 6th review conference and during the General Debate, 
many states argued that institutional support would be necessary inter alia to promote 
universalisation and national implementation. Probably in order to make it more 
palatable to the USA, “implementation support unit” (ISU) was mostly used instead of 
the term “secretariat”. Despite its well-known earlier scepticism and opposition, the USA 
did not oppose establishment of an ISU during the conference, and there was early 
consensus that an ISU would be desirable (Guthrie 2007: 19, 22). 
Four working papers by Canada, the group of Latin American states, the Netherlands 
on behalf of the EU, and Norway in consultation with the JACKSNNZ explicitly dealt 
with implementation support. The papers, like the early negotiations, covered 
administrative support, facilitation of communication and interaction in the regime, 
CBMs, national implementation and universalisation as areas in which the ISU could be 
active. As for the procedural side, none of the papers contained actual figures for staff or 
the budget, but the Norwegian and the Dutch paper argued for a cost-effective unit within 
 
 
50  BWC/CONF.VI/WP.8 (EU); BWC/CONF.VI/WP.11 (plus Corr.1, Latin American states); 
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.18 (New Zealand); BWC/CONF.VI/WP.28 (USA); BWC/CONF.VI/WP.30 (Japan); 
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.32 (NAM). 
51  BWC Final Document, BWC/CONF.VI/6: 19. 
52  Cf. Sims (2006a); cf. also Findlay/Woodward (2004); VERTIC (2006); WMD Commission (2006). 
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DDA. While the Netherlands vaguely mentioned compliance with the BWC, only the 
Norwegian working paper included tasks related to Article V and VI.53  
Agreement on a mandate for the ISU was delayed by the difficult discussions about 
CBMs and national implementation (see below). The draft action plans on national 
implementation and universalisation contained tasks for the ISU such as maintaining lists 
of national contact points, compiling information on implementation measures, 
matching offers of and requests for assistance, and providing reports on activities and 
progress. However, given the disastrous route that the two plans took in the conference 
endgame (see below), these tasks disappeared completely. Some participants privately 
expressed concern that with these losses, the merit of having an ISU at all might be 
questioned. Luckily, even though the issue was raised during the final debate, no 
delegation openly withdrew their consent to establishing the ISU.  
States parties set up the ISU within the Geneva branch of DDA (now ODA). The 
mandate includes administrative support and CBMs only, and it is limited to the tasks 
listed in the Final Document. With regard to administrative support, the ISU will support 
BWC meetings and facilitate communication of states parties with each other, with 
international organisations, with non-governmental organisations and with academic and 
scientific institutions. It will act as a focal point for any information states parties wish or 
are obliged to submit. Moreover, the ISU is to handle the annual CBM submissions, 
remind states parties of the annual submission deadline (15 April), compile and distribute 
data on CBMs, set up a secure website to facilitate information exchange for states parties 
only, provide assistance or help match offers of and requests for assistance in preparing 
the CBMs, and “facilitate activities to promote participation in the CBM process”. Even 
though some delegations wished to see a more active role for the ISU in reviewing and 
analysing the CBM forms54, this did not enjoy consensus. The ISU will be funded by BWC 
members, it is requested to submit an annual report about its activities to states parties, 
and its mandate and performance will be up for review in 2011.55 
Unfortunately, this limited mandate might not allow full exploitation of the potential 
benefits that such a unit could offer to the BWC and its states parties. But it is a step 
forward to have a secretarial body on a more permanent basis at least until 2011 instead of 
the previous ad hoc arrangement. States parties now have a constant point of contact and 
regular communication channels, and combined with the continuous dialogue in the new 
intersessional process, this may enhance interaction and improve information exchanges.  
 
 
53  BWC/CONF.VI/WP.1 (Canada); BWC/CONF.VI/WP.7 (EU); BWC/CONF.VI/WP.13 (plus Corr.1; Latin 
American states); BWC/CONF.VI/WP.16 (Norway). 
54  Cf. e.g. BWC/CONF.VI/WP.14 (Switzerland).  
55  BWC Final Document, BWC/CONF.VI/6: 19-20. 
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A New Intersessional Process 2007-2010 
Based on the assessment that the first intersessional process was useful, many delegations 
from all regional groups expressed their support for a new series of annual meetings 
between the 6th and the 7th review conference in their opening statements. Several states 
suggested that there could be modifications to the mandate and format as compared to 
the last process; for example, some stated that the mandate was too limited, that 
discussions should not be as strictly limited to predefined topics and that these topics 
should be broader than in 2003-2005, that it should be possible to make decisions and 
recommendations, not just compile factual reports, and that the agenda should reflect 
additional elements of the convention. 
Six working papers, submitted by Canada, by France and the UK on behalf of the EU, 
by the group of Latin American States, the NAM, New Zealand in consultation with the 
JACKSNNZ, and South Africa, also contained concrete proposals for the format and 
topics of a new intersessional process.56 They all anticipated annual meetings and 
maintained the previous practice of having meetings of experts and states parties, though 
with some modifications such as holding expert meetings only in 2007-2009 followed by a 
two-week meeting of states parties in 2010 (South Africa), having annual one-week expert 
meetings and two-week meetings of states parties with a mandate to adopt decisions 
(Latin American states), or combining the experts’ and states parties’ meetings into one 
annual two-week session (Canada). New Zealand and Canada advocated that the meetings 
discuss general matters of concern to the BWC, while the EU proposed that states parties 
should be able to make decisions whenever there is consensus without having to refer 
issues to the 7th review conference.  
Given the universal preference for a new intersessional process in principle, 
discussions immediately turned to the topics and format which were among the trickier 
issues for negotiation. As regards the duration and sequence, most delegations favoured 
separate meetings of experts and states parties to allow for a digestion of the expert 
discussions, while others preferred to hold the meetings “back-to-back”, mainly for 
economic reasons (Guthrie 2007: 21; Sims 2007: 357). Meetings are now kept separately, 
as in the first cycle, but expert meetings will last one week instead of two, like the NAM 
working paper suggested. The meetings in 2007 will be chaired by the NAM, in 2008 by 
the Eastern Group, in 2009 by the WEOG and in 2010 again by the NAM (Guthrie 2007: 
21). The Western Group will then chair the 7th review conference in 2011. This was agreed 
with the understanding that the rotation cycle for the review conferences would be held 
separate from that of the intersessionals and that the chair of the review conference would 
also be the chair of the first intersessional (Pearson 2006b: 23). 
 
 
56  BWC/CONF.VI/WP.1 (Canada); BWC/CONF.VI/WP.8 (France/UK); BWC/CONF.VI/WP.11 (Latin 
American states); BWC/CONV.VI/WP.18 (New Zealand); BWC/CONF.VI/WP.20 (South Africa); 
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.32 (NAM). 
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As regards decision-making, several states strictly opposed giving the meetings a 
stronger mandate. Others, within the WEOG and the NAM, favoured allowing the 
meetings of states parties to make decisions or recommendations without having to wait 
for approval by the next review conference, which could delay any follow-up action for 
several years. However, states finally agreed that like in 2003-2005 the meetings “will reach 
any conclusions or results by consensus”. While this mandate does not envisage binding 
decisions at all meetings, at least it does not preclude such decisions either, provided there 
is consensus (cf. Meier 2007: 28). 
As for the work programme, there was broad consensus to have items on national 
implementation (including enforcement, as the USA had suggested in its general 
statement), biosafety and biosecurity, oversight and education/awareness-raising. Also, 
the inclusion of assistance and cooperation in the case of suspected biological weapons 
use as well as cooperation to improve disease surveillance and health systems, while 
requiring certain efforts to find an acceptable wording, were consensual in principle. 
Bioterrorism as an additional topic was dropped relatively early in the process due to the 
objections of Russia in particular (Meier 2007: 28). A Russian proposal to discuss “terms 
and definitions relevant to the convention” did not find the support of any other delegation 
and was deleted in the final phase of the deliberations (CNS 2007; Pearson 2006b).57 The 
most difficult issue to resolve was the question of whether and how to include scientific 
and technological developments as well as cooperation and exchanges in the use of 
biotechnology for peaceful purposes. There was no agreement that the former should be 
part of the intersessional process at all, but as a compromise, it was combined with 
education and awareness-raising. On the latter, the informal consultations between 
Western and NAM delegations were difficult. It was stated at one point that some 
reference to Article X had to be included, because otherwise some NAM could have 
withdrawn their consent to a new process entirely. States parties finally agreed on a 
lengthy and inaccessible passage that included references to international cooperation in 
the peaceful use of biotechnology and capacity-building in disease surveillance, but not to 
export controls (or their removal), as previous proposals had done.58  
Recurring topics were propagated by the EU and Canada and initially included in the 
draft decisions on the 2007-2010 process. The argument was that some issues merit 
annual attention, either in order to create more incentives and political pressure, like in 
the case of implementation, universalisation and CBMs, or because the issue itself requires 
constant attention, like scientific and technological developments. Annual consideration 
of implementation and universalisation was also envisaged in the draft action plans, but 
 
 
57  The inclusion of lists, definitions and threshold quantities had already been a contentious issue during the 
protocol negotiations in the Ad Hoc Group (Littlewood 2005: 81). The topic was vehemently opposed by 
a number of delegations on the grounds that it could weaken the general purpose criterion and hence the 
comprehensive scope of the BWC. 
58  The work programme is contained in BWC Final Document, BWC/CONF.VI/6: 20-21. For a comparison 
of various drafts of the intersessional programme cf. Pearson (2006b: 29-31). 
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when these action plans were dropped, the two themes were also lost as recurring topics. 
The opposition of some states parties left scientific and technological developments being 
only marginally addressed in 2008, and as there was strong resistance by some delegations 
to dealing with CBMs during the intersessional process at all, it was impossible to gain 
consensus on having them either as a recurring theme or as a one-time topic.   
In 2007, states parties will discuss national implementation, including enforcement, 
coordination among law enforcement institutions, and regional and sub-regional 
cooperation. The topics for 2008 will be biosafety and biosecurity as well as oversight, 
education, awareness-raising and codes of conduct (also in the context of potentially 
dangerous scientific and technological developments). Both sets of topics take up issues 
that were discussed in 2003 and 2005, but they are now broader and more detailed. 
The topics for 2009 and 2010 have not been discussed previously in their current form. 
In 2009, the meetings will address international cooperation and exchange in biosciences, 
capacity-building in combating infectious diseases, and identification of needs and 
opportunities to provide assistance – topics that are related to Article X. These meetings 
will provide an important opportunity to discuss the expectations, perceived problems 
and different views on this Article. Contrary to some concerns expressed during the 
review conference, such a discussion could actually contribute to de-politicising and de-
ideologising this issue, as it forces states to reflect on and express their expectations, define 
their needs, and recognise what is already being done under Article X.59 Since this 
discussion would take NAM concerns seriously, it could also weaken the basis of the 
NAM’s criticism of WEOG policies in this context. Moreover, it could render the 
cooperation aspect more credible in the efforts to achieve universality; after all, this was 
one of the reasons Article X was included in the BWC in the first place. 
In 2010, states parties will discuss assistance in the case of alleged use of biological or 
toxin weapons, which will include domestic preparedness and public health. Another 
topic of great concern to many NAM countries, this topic potentially includes a wide 
range of issues from a strong focus on domestic health systems to international health 
cooperation to questions of how to determine the source of an attack and how to ensure 
effective responses.  
Agreement on a new work programme was not a matter of course. Even though the 
mandate is as limited as the last was, it is good to have new intersessional meetings on 
useful topics that are not a mere repetition of the previous ones. The topics address some 
deficits of the regime, and, if worked on effectively, could even contribute to mitigating 
one of the dominant political conflicts in the regime. Given the very limited time available 
for the meetings, however, this will require intense preparation and a lot of political good 
will.  
 
 
59  Pearson argues that “it is likely that progress reports [on Article X implementation, U.B.] would have 
demonstrated that Article X is already being implemented very effectively by many States Parties especially 
in the developed world” (Pearson 2006b: 36). 
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Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) 
Proposals as to how CBM submission could be facilitated, how the forms could be 
reviewed and improved, and how participation could hence be increased, had been 
discussed by states and NGOs already prior to the conference.60 In the General Debate, 
most states that mentioned CBMs signalled their readiness to review or at least thoroughly 
discuss the measures. Some proposed establishing a working group during the conference 
or in its wake, or suggested including CBMs in a second intersessional process.  
Six working papers by Canada, by France on behalf of the EU, by the group of Latin 
American states, by South Africa, and by Switzerland (nationally and in consultation with 
the JACKSNNZ) covered CBMs in more detail.61 They all considered the review of the 
existing CBMs necessary and desirable, and they called for more user-friendly forms to 
facilitate submission and increase the utility of the process; suggestions included 
employing more tick boxes and multiple-choice questions (which could also mitigate the 
translation problem), reducing ambiguities in the language and making the forms 
electronically available to facilitate submission and dissemination. Switzerland propagated 
making the CBMs publicly available on the Internet, arguing that “wider access to CBMs 
can be an incentive for States Parties to increase quality and quantity of the data submitted”. 
The Latin American states proposed that guidelines be developed to enhance CBM 
implementation.62 Proposals regarding the function of DDA or the ISU included 
preparing summaries of CBM elements and trends (Canada), sending out reminders 
before and after the annual deadline (EU), as well as analysing the returns, checking their 
plausibility and clarifying misunderstandings or omissions (Switzerland). 
Despite intense efforts and the many concrete proposals, agreement could not even be 
reached to open discussions on modest technical improvements to the forms. Many 
Western and NAM states, including the USA, would have accepted a working group to 
that end during the conference, but other delegations opposed this (cf. Sims 2007: 365). 
Likewise, the USA and China refused to accept CBMs as a topic for the intersessional 
process (Meier 2007: 28; cf. also CNS 2007; Sims 2007: 365). The only modification that 
could be agreed was the possibility for states parties to submit the CBMs electronically, 
and for DDA (in future the ISU) to distribute them electronically and make them 
available on a secure website.63  
 
 
60  Cf. Geneva Forum (2006); Tokyo Seminar (2006); BWC/CONF.VI/PC/INF.1 (Canada). For more general 
NGO proposals cf. Feakes/Pearson (2006: 41-42); Isla/Hunger (2006); Pearson (2006b); VERTIC (2006: 
63-70); for proposals based on an analysis of the actual CBM returns cf. Hunger/Isla (2006); Isla (2006); 
for an earlier analysis and recommendations cf. Geissler (1990). 
61  BWC/CONF.VI/WP.1 (Canada); BWC/CONF.VI/WP.4 (France); BWC/CONF.VI/WP.12 (plus Corr.1; 
Latin American states); BWC/CONF.VI/WP.14 (Switzerland); BWC/CONF.VI/WP.21 (South Africa); 
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.37 (Switzerland).  
62  Canada compiled a guide to the completion of the CBMs in 2004. It is available at 
www.opbw.org/cbms/Guide_files/v3_document.htm; 20.06.2007.  
63  BWC Final Document, BWC/CONF.VI/6: 22. 
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There is currently no mandate for any collective action to review the CBM system. 
This, however, does not preclude states from taking individual action to that end in order 
to facilitate effective action once a review becomes possible (cf. Sims 2007: 366). One 
example for such action is the current initiative by Switzerland and a group of non-
governmental experts: It aims at analysing the domestic data collection processes and 
their overall approach regarding CBM completion with the goal of better understanding 
the causes for (non-)participation and providing a more solid basis for future discussions 
on improvements to the process. 
Universalisation 
Universalisation of a treaty and its norms through achieving universal membership is a 
common objective in all arms control and disarmament regimes. With 157 full members, 
the BWC significantly lags behind the NPT (190 members64) and the CWC (182 
members), but in the absence of a BWC organisation or regular meetings, BWC members 
have not taken any collective action so far.65  
During the General Debate, universalisation was the issue mentioned most frequently, 
and the idea of intensified action received unanimous support in all regional groups. The 
four working papers about universality, submitted by Australia, by South Korea (both in 
consultation with the JACKSNNZ), by the group of Latin American states, and by Italy on 
behalf of the EU, emphasised the need for concerted action.66 They also considered some 
form of secretariat, implementation support or coordination necessary to support this 
concerted action and to fulfil a variety of other tasks.  
Discussions on a draft Action Plan on Universalisation, inspired by a similar plan 
under the CWC, went relatively smoothly (Pearson 2006b: 32). States parties agreed to 
promote universalisation through bilateral, regional and multilateral activities, to inform 
the ISU of their activities and of a national point of contact, and to report to the meetings 
of states parties of their activities. The chairs of the intersessional meetings will act as 
coordinators for universalisation efforts and provide annual progress reports. The ISU 
will support these activities, but is not supposed to take any action on its own.67  
The relegation of the original “Action Plan” to a decision on “Promotion of 
Universalisation” in the Final Document was due to a much more virulent controversy 
around the Action Plan on (National/Comprehensive) Implementation (see below) and 
not to differences around universalisation as such. Nevertheless, since there are no specific 
 
 
64  The UN website still lists North Korea, which declared its withdrawal from the treaty in 2003 and whose 
current status is unclear, as NPT member (http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf; 20.06.07); the 
non-members are Cook Islands, India, Israel, Niue and Pakistan. 
65  For ideas for a more effective universalisation strategy cf. Feakes (2006); Feakes/Pearson (2006: 37-39). 
66  BWC/CONF.VI/WP.6 (Italy), BWC/CONF.VI/WP.9 (plus Corr.1, Latin American states), 
BWC/CONF.VI/WP.15 (Australia), BWC/CONF.VI/WP.19 (South Korea). 
67  BWC Final Document, BWC/CONF.VI/6: 23. 
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activities and/or targets mentioned, and since there is only a vague mandate for the chairs 
of the intersessionals and the ISU, this decision will likely be less effective than an action 
plan with a stronger mandate could have been (cf. Pearson 2006b: 35). 
National (Comprehensive) Implementation  
National implementation was discussed as a cross-cutting issue but could not be included 
in the Final Declaration, although its importance was widely acknowledged in the General 
Debate. The Canadian working paper suggested that states parties promote national 
implementation with specific goals, time lines and methods, report regularly e.g. at the 
meetings of states parties and in CBMs, and provide implementation support. Germany 
had prepared an analysis of the current state and practice of national implementation and 
suggested that states parties develop a catalogue of existing legislation to guide states in 
establishing or improving their legislation. Japan presented concrete proposals on relevant 
national measures.68 
Despite the agreement that progress in this area was desirable, the discussions around a 
draft Action Plan on National Implementation were extremely difficult and ultimately 
failed. Such an action plan had been a preference of many Western states, but NAM 
delegations were reluctant to accept what several members called an imbalanced view on 
the BWC. The conflict became virulent when the NAM tabled an additional draft Plan of 
Action on Implementation of Article X.69 Several Western states opposed the approach of 
singling out just one article, while several NAM states made their acceptance of the first 
action plan conditional on greater emphasis on Article X implementation. The 
compromise effort by the president to merge the two documents into one Action Plan on 
Comprehensive Implementation failed, as it still contained elements that were 
unacceptable to some Western states, especially the USA (Khan 2007: 15; Meier 2007: 28; 
Sims 2007: 362), but on which NAM states like Iran, Algeria, China, Cuba and India 
insisted (CNS 2007; Meier 2007: 29). In order not to jeopardise a consensus outcome, 
President Khan proposed to delete both implementation action plans and turn the third 
into a decision on the “Promotion of Universalisation” (Khan 2007: 15). While this may 
have been the wisest decision given the hardening fronts, it is nevertheless deplorable. 
There was widespread recognition of the significance of national implementation, and an 
action plan that required national focal points in states parties and that nominated 
coordinators for collective efforts would have helped greatly. In the absence of a mandate 
for the ISU, the initiative is now left to individual states and NGOs. 
 
 
68  BWC/CONF.VI/WP.1 (Canada); BWC/CONF.VI/WP.3 (Germany); BWC/CONF.VI/WP.17 (Japan). 
69  For full versions of some drafts cf. Pearson (2006b: 32-35); cf. also Guthrie (2007: 25-28). 
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5. Recommendations and Conclusions  
The 6th review conference showed that meaningful and pragmatic cooperation is possible 
in the regime, and it revealed a degree of interest, activism and sense of ownership among 
states parties that bodes well for the next cycle of intersessional meetings. There is now a 
full and comprehensive review of the BWC that contains important consensual 
reaffirmations and new understandings; and there is a much improved working 
atmosphere (no doubt brought about by the constant interaction and exchange in 2003-
2005, as it facilitated the recognition of common interests and fostered a shared 
perception of current circumstances, risks and necessities). Moreover, the results in the 
form of collective follow-up action go beyond merely keeping the dialogue alive and can 
potentially mitigate some of the deficits identified in chapter 2, namely insufficient 
implementation and a lack of organisational support. Bearing in mind the political 
context, these are positive results, and it is useful to have an expanded focus on biological 
issues, which now includes non-state actors and problems that stem from biology but are 
only indirectly related to biological weapons. Viewing the outcome from a more abstract 
arms control perspective, however, it becomes clear that major deficits of the regime 
remain unattended to, as, except for improved communication, the current measures 
hardly foster predictability and stability in inter-state relations.  
The following recommendations flow from these two different perspectives. They 
include measures to make effective use of what is available in the new intersessional 
process and in the current political situation, especially in the areas of implementation, 
but also regarding cooperation under Article X and assistance under Article VII. They also 
suggest considering some ideas that go beyond the topics for 2007-2010 but that are 
nevertheless doable and do not require new negotiations, as they are based on existing 
measures and ideas.  
5.1 The Intersessional Process 2007-2010 
As time for discussion will be shorter than in the last process and the issues equally 
voluminous, a lot will depend on thorough preparation of all meetings. The 6th review 
conference has shown that advance circulation of papers and proposals as well as early 
discussions and exchanges of views can contribute to a good working atmosphere and to 
preparing a common ground. Especially in 2007 and 2008, states parties can resort to a 
vast number of documents, proposals, documentations and compilations that were 
gathered during the last intersessional process. Hence, it is to be hoped that they will be 
able to make maximum use of the two weeks allotted to the meetings each year. It would 
be useful to invite practitioners from academia and commerce to the expert meetings who 
are potential multipliers for all those measures that cannot be enacted at state level but 
have to emanate from the stakeholders’ communities. Given the solid basis for the 
discussions, states hopefully will not satisfy themselves with reaching vague common 
conclusions. Instead, they could try to come to binding recommendations and have states 
parties report on their implementation at the following meetings.  
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5.1.1 National Implementation (2007) and Awareness-Raising (2008) 
The 2007 intersessionals will provide an important opportunity to somewhat compensate 
for the loss of the Action Plan on National Implementation. While it might not be 
politically feasible to resurrect the action plan in its previous form, as the debates of 2006 
would likely resurface, it may be worthwhile to consider reviving at least some elements, 
such as  
• tasking the ISU to provide and coordinate assistance, 
• reporting to the ISU and other members on the state of and progress with 
national implementation, 
• encouraging states parties to designate national focal points or points of contact. 
Reporting would ideally happen before a specific deadline or to the following meeting of 
states parties, as the time gap might be too large and the sense of urgency lost if it were 
postponed until 2011. Since all states are obligated to report under Resolution 1540 /1673 
and CBM E anyway, the additional effort would be minimal for those who already fulfil 
these obligations, but the benefit would be significant: States parties would demonstrate 
the willingness to not only discuss and promote certain measures, but also to ensure 
effective action. In addition, such a requirement would significantly increase the political 
pressure to act and enhance compliance with Resolution 1540 and CBM E. The pressure 
on those states that do not yet have legislation and regulations in place would be much 
higher with a reporting requirement. 
Several of the topics for 2007 (national implementation) and 2008 (biosafety, 
biosecurity, oversight, education, awareness-raising, codes of conduct), albeit different, 
should allow for some analogous approaches, such as:  
• developing catalogues, databases and/or checklists of important measures70,  
• establishing (real or virtual) working groups to compile such databases and 
checklists outside the meetings (to save time for discussion of the new elements of 
the topics), 
• organising seminars, workshops or, where suitable, electronic exchanges not 
simply on a regional basis, but based on identified needs, on types of legal or 
administrative systems, or on types of legislation and regulations to be dealt with 
(identification of which would be much facilitated by checklists). 
5.1.2 Action Related to Article X (2009) and Article VII (2010) 
As the deliberations at the 6th review conference showed, Article X and related issues 
provide one of the major problems in the BWC regime. While the debates around export 
controls appear somewhat mitigated (see chapter 4.2), those around technological 
exchange, cooperation and development are still virulent. At the same time, the past 
 
 
70  Cf. e.g. BWC/CONF.VI/WP. 3 (Germany). 
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intersessional process has demonstrated that discussions outside negotiation fora can 
contribute to depoliticising issues and facilitate a convergence of views and perceptions, 
and there is no reason why this should not work with Article X in a similar way.  
Currently, there seems to be more rhetoric and ideology than substance to these 
debates. At the same time, there are real concerns and needs in the developing world as 
regards for instance the effectiveness of health systems and the availability of affordable 
medication, and increased action could help ameliorate the overall situation there. It 
could also contribute to better domestic preparedness against biological threats, which is a 
crucial concern in the regime. Moreover, Article X was included in the BWC as an 
incentive for countries to join the treaty, and this purpose is not obsolete today. More 
visible cooperation might still induce some states outside the treaty to accede to it and 
contribute to a sustained support for it among members. Finally, an objectified debate 
would tackle one of the major political stumbling blocks for progress in the regime. 
Hence, there are several reasons to take Article X more seriously than in the past. A 
serious debate would force NAM members to reflect on and voice their expectations and 
needs more concretely, and it would offer the industrialised countries an opportunity to 
demonstrate what is already being done under Article X. The intersessional meetings in 
2009 could be used to initiate such a process, but it will certainly need more than two 
weeks to achieve visible results. States parties could thus consider holding additional 
meetings or establish specific working groups on single topics; this could for example be 
done by making use of the consultation provision under Article V (see below).  
As for the topic for 2010, assistance in the case of biological weapons use, the mandate 
only lists “national capabilities for disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and public 
health systems” as a specific element of this issue. It would be useful if discussions were not 
limited to this but could overcome the historical reservations and include actual assistance 
procedures to facilitate coordination of help and quick responses. This could include: 
• establishing primary points of contact in states parties, but also at the UN or 
the ISU, to facilitate coordination of  requests for and offers of assistance, 
• compiling systematic information on which type of assistance states could 
provide (e.g. detection/diagnosis, medical or logistical support etc.), 
• providing information on measures in place to react to bioweapons incidents. 
If elaborated and propagated adequately, such action could also serve as an additional 
incentive to join the treaty, especially given the newly agreed understanding that Article 
VII might also cover cases of non-state actor use of biological agents or toxins. 
5.2 Recommendation for Action Beyond the Intersessional Process 
While the conditions for productive work within the current context are relatively good, 
the limits within which BWC members move are still narrow. To make the BWC more 
effective as an arms control measure, it might be necessary not only to fully exploit the 
options within these limits but also to try to carefully and slowly push them. This could be 
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done for instance by addressing three measures that would not require new negotiations, 
but that, if strengthened, could provide a more predictable framework for inter-state 
relations and solidify the regime: Article V (consultation procedures and CBMs), the UN 
Secretary General’s investigation mechanism, and universalisation of the BWC norms. 
5.2.1  Article V – Consultation Procedures and CBMs 
Article V, which provides for consultations among members, has been invoked only once, 
and only for the gravest case possible: the allegation of biological weapons use.71 However, 
the Article covers “any problems” related to the convention. If depoliticised and stripped 
of the sole connotation of accusation and BWC violation, this consultation process could 
provide a useful additional ad hoc forum for states parties. In order to reduce 
politicisation from the outset, states could in advance informally and transparently 
explore the willingness of others to take part in this process and then jointly convene a 
consultative meeting. These meetings should be focussed and deal with specific issues. 
Possible initial topics include Article X elements and CBMs, both of which will have no or 
not enough room in the intersessional discussions.  
As regards CBMs, even if collective action will have to wait until 2011, so many 
concrete proposals have been made that there is ample material to prepare for this 
occasion early (cf. Sims 2007: 366). In the meantime, it is left to individual states to  
• use all political and diplomatic channels available to encourage participation in 
the CBM process, 
• continue to informally explore areas for improvement,  
• set up a forum to discuss current problems and analyse their sources, e.g. using 
the consultation procedures,  
• publish their CBMs on the Internet, in this context share their experiences 
regarding domestic preparations, and lobby to increase acceptance of CBM 
publication in other countries. 
Luckily, over recent years there has been a marked increase in interest among certain 
states parties in making CBM information publicly available on a voluntary basis.72 If 
these states successfully lobbied others to do likewise, publication could slowly become 
 
 
71  In 1997, Cuba accused the USA of having spread a plant pest (Thrips palmii) over its territory; the issue 
could not be fully resolved, as the consultations did not deliver any definitive results (cf. e.g. Zilinskas 
1999: 206-217). 
72  Background communication with Piers Millett, ISU. In the past, Australia (2001, 2003, 2004, 2005), 
Finland (2005), Lithuania (2005), Malaysia (2005), Sweden (2005), Switzerland (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005), 
the UK ((2003, 2004, 2005) and the USA (2003) made their CBMs publicly available (www.unog.ch; 
www.opbw.org/cbms/annual_cbm.htm). At the time of writing, the UK and Germany have published 
their 2006 CBMs on the Internet; Switzerland has indicated it will do likewise (http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/BioChemie/VerbotBioWaffen-dt-Jahresmeldg06.pdf (Ger-
many); http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=
1065432161527 (UK)). 
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the rule rather than the exception, which would shift the burden of justification from 
those publishing CBMs to those keeping them classified. States that have concerns about 
publishing their full CBMs, or that are prevented from doing so by complex interagency 
processes or domestic regulations, could consider making the submissions partially 
available. While this is far from ideal, some information may still be better than none.  
5.2.2 Investigation of Alleged Use of Biological Weapons 
As described in chapter 3.1, the UN Secretary General’s mechanism is currently the only 
procedure available to the UN Security Council and to BWC states parties to investigate 
cases of suspected biological weapons use under Article VI. It would be important that 
BWC parties collectively acknowledge more strongly than before the value of this 
mechanism for the BWC and strengthen its ties with the regime. 
In the meantime, it will be up to ODA and UN members to make the mechanism in its 
current form more effective. Hopefully, the ODA review of the investigation guidelines 
and procedures will pay special attention to the different requirements for investigations 
of alleged chemical weapons use (which have been carried out before) and biological 
weapons use (which has never been investigated). But even upon completion of the 
review and update process, the degree to which it can be used effectively will still remain 
unclear, given that the investigation teams will only be put together ad hoc and that many 
experts will likely never have participated in an investigation of this kind. In the long run, 
it would be desirable to have a standing group of experts at the Secretary General’s 
disposal.73 In the meantime, training sessions for the rostered experts and also for ODA 
staff would contribute significantly to making the mechanism more effective and 
reliable74, especially since it is crucial that investigations are carried out in a timely and 
impartial manner. Such training sessions could also test and improve states’ domestic 
preparedness for an investigation on their territory, e.g. in the event of a suspected attack 
by another state or non-state actors. Since there is currently no basis for collective action 
to this end in the BWC framework, such training activities would have to be organised by 
individual states in cooperation with ODA. The discussions in Geneva showed that there 
should be sufficient interest among states parties to support such undertakings.  
5.2.3 Universalisation of the BWC Norms Through International Customary Law75  
In the BWC forum, universalisation is usually discussed as achieving universal 
membership of the BWC. However, international norms can achieve universal status also 
through international customary law. Universally binding norms offer the chance to 
 
 
73  For different ideas on how such a standing expertise could look like cf. e.g. Becker et al. (2005); Findlay 
(2005); Rosenberg (2004, 2007); cf. also DDA (2004).  
74  Cf. Littlewood 2006. Cf. also BWC/CONF.VI/WP.37 (Germany); BWC/MSP/2004/MX/WP.56 (UK). 
75  I am grateful to Philip Liste for helpful comments on this section. On WMD and international law cf. 
Fidler (2003). 
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unequivocally distinguish “right” from “wrong” behaviour, including the possibility of 
legitimate action in response to “wrong” behaviour. They also offer a very strong 
foundation on which the international community can act if these norms are violated, 
through multilateral action in the framework of existing treaties, through the UN Security 
Council or through the UN Secretary General.  
BWC members have agreed to take more intensive action on universalisation, and the 
EU has committed its members to “working towards the ban on biological and toxin 
weapons being declared universally binding rules of international law, including through 
universalisation of the BTWC” in its Common Position (see chapter 3.3.2, emphasis 
added). In parallel to – and by no means instead of – this approach, it could also be 
explored to what extent the norm prohibiting development, stockpiling and especially 
proliferation of biological weapons is already part of international customary law (cf. 
Findlay 2005: 8), or how it could become part of it. 
Customary international law is built upon two components: state practice and opinio 
iuris. As for state practice, a great majority of states have never developed or possessed 
biological weapons or have long renounced them voluntarily. For several decades, non-
possession and non-proliferation of biological weapons has been the rule rather than the 
exception in international relations, and there is no “persistent objector” insisting on the 
right to possess biological weapons. In turn, the international community has repeatedly 
condemned possession and proliferation of biological weapons, and the UN Security 
Council has declared the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and of 
materials for their manufacture a “threat to international peace and security”.76 Arguably, 
the norm contained in the BWC is so strong that today no state can or will legitimately 
claim to possess and have developed biological weapons, no matter if the state in question 
is a member of the BWC or not.77 The biological weapons taboo has been very strong for 
more than a century (cf. Zanders 2003), and there is a taboo on biological weapons use 
that has long been considered international customary law (SIPRI 1973). If the 
prohibition of use is considered a universally binding norm, this should extend to the 
preparation of such use, i.e. development and possession of biological weapons. 
Hence, even a cursory overview of state practice strongly points towards a universal 
standard, so that consideration of this approach appears well founded. In order to explore 
to what extent the prohibition of biological weapons as contained in the BWC has entered 
international customary law, it would be important to  
• investigate state practice (the renunciation of biological weapons) in more detail,  
• explore the degree to which this practice is based on a sense of obligation on the 
part of states (opinio iuris),  
 
 
76  Note by the President of the Security Council, S 23500, 31.01.1992; UN Security Council Resolutions 
S/RES/1540 (2004); S/RES/1673 (2006) (http://documents.un.org; 20.06.2007). 
77  Cf. also Statement by the BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP) to the 6th Review Conference of the 
BTWC, Geneva, 21.11.2006: 2. 
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• solicit opinions of leading international law scholars on this question,  
• request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, similar to that 
on the legality of nuclear weapons.78 
This would by no means render the treaty itself irrelevant. In addition to representing the 
legal foundation of the regime, it provides procedures – however weak they may currently 
be – to deal with suspected norm violations, it is the basis for a wide range of measures in 
the biological field (biosafety, biosecurity, public health, bioterrorism, and others), and it 
provides a legal framework within which verification and compliance measures of 
whatever form could be agreed one day. Moreover, the process of a norm entering 
international customary law can be lengthy and difficult, and in the meantime it is 
important that the existing norms are strengthened as much as possible. The advantage of 
having an additional strategy would be that, if successful, the international community 
will have a solid legal basis for action even against non-BWC members, and the United 
Nations – through the Security Council and/or the Secretary General – could play a much 
more effective role than is currently the case. 
5.3 Conclusions 
Is there light at the end of the tunnel for the BWC? The past five years have shown that the 
constant interaction in the BWC regime had a positive impact upon state interaction even 
in an antagonistic situation. The feeling of success and ownership, the convergence of 
interests in a number of areas, and the broad common ground across the regional groups 
that could be established at the 6th review conference provide advantageous conditions for 
further solidifying the BWC. Its members have broadened their view on the scope and 
dimensions of the “biological problem”, including for example aspects of biosafety and 
biosecurity alongside with police and health issues, and progress has been made in these 
areas. This came with the recognition that other actors formerly considered outside the 
BWC regime may have an important role to play in this expanded setting.79 Even the 
political conflict around export controls appears somewhat abated, though it remains to 
be seen to what extent this will spill over to other Article X issues. The focus of the work 
has shifted to pragmatic steps to tackle a range of problems that are either national (like 
implementation, awareness-raising or domestic preparedness) or shared problems (like 
infectious diseases or bioterrorism) that are exogenous to state-to-state relations, and the 
6th review conference encouraged the hope that there might be further progress during the 
next intersessional process in this area.  
It seems thus fair to say that there is indeed some light at the end of the tunnel. 
However, only some of the deficits are being addressed at all, so this applies only to one of 
 
 
78  “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons”, International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion of 8 
July 1996 (http://www.icj-cij.org; 20.06.2007). 
79  For an overview over the relevant actors and measures in the biological weapons context cf. Millett (2006). 
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two tracks in the BWC regime that diverged after 2001. The other one that could be 
leading to more stable state-to-state relations trough increased transparency, binding 
obligations and verification of states’ compliance is still left in the dark. This was a 
deliberate decision at this point and without it, progress in the other areas would not have 
been possible. But the recent successes notwithstanding, this approach carries the risk that 
the BWC may become just one of several instruments to tackle biological problems of all 
kinds, and that states may settle on a low level of ambition as far as the arms control and 
security aspects of the BWC are concerned. Yet, the BWC does not only serve as a 
normative framework for all these other activities but has its very own value as an arms 
control instrument, too, and as such, it remains weak. 
To sustain the BWC’s unique functions, states parties will eventually have to turn to 
procedural issues, initiate a new discourse on compliance and verification as well as re-
focus on inter-state relations, since an interplay of a deteriorating international security 
environment, new scientific and technological developments, and intensive yet 
intransparent biodefence activities could produce or intensify “traditional” security risks. 
Bringing light to this second track would, however, require a profound policy shift in 
some states. Yet, it is important not to lose sight of this aspect, and the regime has proved 
sufficiently dynamic to incorporate a wide range of measures in varying forms. Only if 
both tracks are being followed – not necessarily in a one-in-all approach, but in the same 
framework of action – will the regime be truly strengthened and the potential of the BWC 
as an arms control instrument and core of the regime be fully exploited. 
6. Bibliography 
Bailey, Kathleen 2002: Why the United States Rejected the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention, Fairfax: National Institute for Public Policy. 
Becker, Una/Müller, Harald/Wunderlich, Carmen 2005: While Waiting for the Protocol: An Interim 
Compliance Mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention, in: The Nonproliferation Review 
12: 3, 541-572. 
Borrie, John 2006: The Limits of Modest Progress: The Rise, Fall, and Return of Efforts to 
Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, in: Arms Control Today 36: 8, 18-22.  
Brugger, Seth 2002: BWC Conference Suspended After Controversial End, in: Arms Control Today, 
32: 1, 34-35. 
Bull, Hedley 1961: The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile 
Age, New York, NY. 
Burns, Richard Dean 1993: Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, New York, NY. 
Chevrier, Marie I./Hunger, Iris 2000: Confidence-Building Measures for the BTWC: Performance 
and Potential, in: The Nonproliferation Review 7: 3, 24-42. 
Chevrier, Marie I. 2001:  The Biological Weapons Convention:  The Protocol That Almost Was, in: 
Verification Yearbook 2001, London, 79-97. 
Chevrier, Marie I. 2002/2003: Waiting for Godot or Saving the Show? The BWC Review Conference 
Reaches Modest Agreement, in: Disarmament Diplomacy 68, 11-16. 
Light at the End of the Tunnel? 37
 
 
CNS 2007: The Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention: Success or 
Failure? Interview with Jonathan B. Tucker, CNS Research Story, Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies, Monterey, 04.01.2007 (http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/070104.htm; 13.03.07). 
Croft, Stuart 1996: Strategies of Arms Control, Manchester. 
Dando, Malcolm 2002: Preventing Biological Warfare: The Failure of American Leadership, 
Houndmills/Basingstoke. 
DDA 2004: Multilateral Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regimes and the Role of the United 
Nations: An Evaluation. Contribution of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters to the 
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, DDA Occasional Papers No. 8, New York. 
Feakes, Daniel 2006: Practical Steps for Accelerating BWC Universality, in: Disarmament 
Diplomacy 82, 27-33. 
Feakes, Daniel/Pearson, Graham S. 2006: Achieving the Outcomes of the Sixth Review Conference, 
in: Disarmament Forum 3/2006, 37-46. 
Fidler, David P. 2003: Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Law, in: ASIL Insights, 
American Society of International Law, February 2003 (http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh97.htm; 
20.06.2007). 
Fidler, David P. 2007: Outcome of the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons 
Convention, in: ASIL Insights, American Society of International Law 11: 3 
(http://asil.org/insights/2007/02/insights070223.html; 20.06.2007). 
Findlay, Trevor/Woodward, Angela 2004: Enhancing BWC Implementation: A Modular Approach, 
WMD Commission Paper 23. 
Findlay, Trevor 2005: A Standing United Nations WMD Verification Body: Necessary and Feasible, 
Compliance Chronicles 1, Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance. 
Findlay, Trevor 2006: Verification and the BWC: Last Gasp or Signs of Life? in: Arms Control 
Today 36: 7, 12-16. 
Fox, Jon 2006: BWC Conference Hailed as Success, in: Global Security Newswire, 15.12. 2006. 
Geissler, Erhard (ed.) 1990: Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention by Confidence-
Building Measures, SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies 10, Stockholm: SIPRI. 
Geneva Forum 2006: Meeting the Challenges of Reviewing the Biological & Toxin Weapons 
Convention, 9-10 March, 2006, Glion, Switzerland (http://www.geneva-
forum.org/Reports/20060309-10.pdf; 20.06.2007). 
Goldblat, Jozef 2002: Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, London et al. 
Gray, Colin S. 1992: House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail, Ithaca, NY. 
Gray, Colin S. 2003: The Reformation of Deterrence: Moving On, in: Comparative Strategy 22: 5, 
429-461. 
Guthrie, Richard/Hart, John/Kuhlau, Frida/Simon, Jacqueline 2004: Chemical and Biological 
Warfare Developments and Arms Control, in: SIPRI Yearbook 2004, Oxford et al., 659-696. 
Guthrie, Richard/Hart, John/Kuhlau, Frida 2006: Chemical and Biological Warfare Developments 
and Arms Control, in: SIPRI Yearbook 2006, Oxford et al., 707-731. 
Guthrie, Richard 2007: Rising Out of the Doldrums: Report on the BWC Review Conference, in: 
Disarmament Diplomacy 84, 16-28. 
Harrington, Caitlin 2007: Chemical Weapons Deadlines Extended, in: Arms Control Today 37: 1, 
29-30. 
Hart, John/Kuhlau, Frida/Simon, Jacqueline 2003: Chemical and Biological Weapon Developments 
and Arms Control, in: SIPRI Yearbook 2003, Oxford et al., 645-690. 
38 Una Becker 
 
 
Hunger, Iris/Isla, Nicholas 2006: Confidence-Building Needs Transparency: An Analysis of the 
BTWC’s Confidence-Building Measures, in: Disarmament Forum 3/2006, 27-36.  
Isla, Nicholas 2006: Transparency in Past Offensive Biological Weapons Programmes: An Analysis 
of Confidence Building Measure Form F 1992-2003. Hamburg Centre for Biological Arms Control, 
Occasional Paper No. 1, Hamburg, June 2006. 
Isla, Nicholas/Hunger, Iris 2006: Building Transparency Through Confidence Building Measures, 
in: Arms Control Today 36: 6, 19-22. 
Isla, Nicholas 2007: Strengthening the BWC’s Confidence Building Measure Regime: A Catalogue 
of Recommendations, Research Group for Biological Arms Control at Hamburg University, 
Occasional Paper No. 3, Hamburg, March 2007. 
Kelle, Alexander 2003: Strengthening the effectiveness of the BTW control regime - feasibility and 
options, in; Contemporary Security Policy 24: 2, 95-138. 
Kelle, Alexander/Nixdorff, Kathryn/Dando, Malcolm 2006: Controlling Biochemical Weapons. 
Adapting Multilateral Arms Control for the 21st Century, Houndmills/Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Kervers, Onno 2002: Strengthening Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention: The 
Protocol Negotiations, in: Journal of Conflict and Security Law 7: 2, 275-292. 
Kervers, Onno 2003: Strengthening Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention: The 
Draft Protocol, in: Journal of Conflict and Security Law 8: 1, 161-200. 
Khan, Masood 2007: The 2006 BWC Review Conference: The President’s Reflections, in: 
Disarmament Diplomacy 84, 13-16. 
Leitenberg, Milton 2005: Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat, Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College. 
Lennane, Richard 2006: Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat: The Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention Since 2001, in: Disarmament Forum 3/2006, 5-16. 
Littlewood, Jez 2003: Substance Hidden Under a Mountain of Paper: The BWC Experts’ Meeting in 
2003, in: Disarmament Diplomacy 73, 63-66. 
Littlewood, Jez 2005: The Biological Weapons Convention: A Failed Revolution, Aldershot: 
Ashgate. 
Littlewood, Jez 2006: Investigating Allegations of CBW Use: Reviving the UN Secretary-General’s 
Mechanism, Compliance Chronicles 3, Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance. 
Littlewood, Jez 2007: Out of the Valley: Advancing the Biological Weapons Convention After the 
2006 Review Conference, in: Arms Control Today 37: 2, 12-16. 
Meier, Oliver 2002: Bare-Bones Multilateralism at the BWC Review Conference, in: Arms Control 
Today 32: 10, 19-27. 
Meier, Oliver 2006: Bioweapons Treaty Progress Predicted, in: Arms Control Today 36: 9, 36-38. 
Meier, Oliver 2007: States Strengthen Biological Weapons Convention, in: Arms Control Today 37: 
1, 27-29. 
Millett, Piers D. 2006: The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in Context: From Monolith 
to Keystone, in: Disarmament Forum 3/2006, 47-64. 
Nguyen, Michael 2006: States Agree on BWC Conference Agenda, in: Arms Control Today 36: 5, 
40. 
Pearson, Graham S. 2002: The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference, in: 
CBW Conventions Bulletin 58, 19-26. 
Pearson, Graham S. 2003a: The Biological Weapons Convention New Process, in: CBW 
Conventions Bulletin 61, 8-14.  
Light at the End of the Tunnel? 39
 
 
Pearson, Graham S. 2003b: The Biological Weapons Convention New Process, in: CBW 
Conventions Bulletin 62, 20-28.  
Pearson, Graham S. 2004a: The Biological Weapons Convention New Process, in: CBW 
Conventions Bulletin 65, 12-20.  
Pearson, Graham S. 2004b: The Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties, in: CBW 
Conventions Bulletin 66, 21-34.  
Pearson, Graham S. 2005a: The Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of Experts, in: CBW 
Conventions Bulletin 68, 12-19.  
Pearson, Graham S. 2005b: The Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties, 2005, in: 
CBW Conventions Bulletin 69+70, 15-27.  
Pearson, Graham S. 2006a: The Preparatory Committee for the Sixth BWC Review Conference, in: 
The CBW Conventions Bulletin 71, 6-15. 
Pearson, Graham S. 2006b: The Biological Weapons Convention Sixth Review Conference, in: The 
CBW Conventions Bulletin 74, 1-36. 
Pearson, Graham S. 2007: The Successful Outcome of the Sixth BTWC Review Conference, Review 
Conference Paper No. 19, Bradford: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. 
Rissanen, Jenni 2001: A Turning Point to Nowhere? BWC in Trouble as US Turns Its Back on 
Verification Protocol, in: Disarmament Diplomacy 59, 11-17. 
Rissanen, Jenni 2002: Left in Limbo: Review Conference Suspended On Edge of Collapse, in: 
Disarmament Diplomacy 62, 18-45. 
Roberts, Guy 2003: Arms Control Without Arms Control: The Failure of the Biological Weapons 
Convention Protocol and a New Paradigm for Fighting the Threat of Biological Weapons. INSS 
Occasional Paper No. 49, Institute for National Security Studies, Colorado: US Air Force Academy. 
Rosenberg, Barbara 2001: Allergic Reaction: Washington's Response to the BWC Protocol, in: Arms 
Control Today 31: 6, 3-8. 
Rosenberg, Barbara 2004: Enforcing WMD Treaties: Consolidating a UN Role, in: Disarmament 
Diplomacy 75, 3-9. 
Rosenberg, Barbara 2007: A Counter-Bioterrorism Strategy for the New UN Secretary-General, in: 
Disarmament Diplomacy 84, 29-35. 
Ruppe, David 2006: BWC Countries Agree to Review Conference Agenda, Global Security 
Newswire, 5.5.2006 (http://www.nti.org; 20.06.2007). 
Schelling, Thomas /Halperin, Morton H. 1985: Strategy and Arms Control, Washington, DC. 
Schneidmiller, Chris 2006: Expert Anticipates Little Change at BWC Conference, Global Security 
Newswire, 6.7.2006 (http://www.nti.org; 20.06.2007). 
Sims, Nicholas A. 2003: Biological Disarmament Diplomacy in the Doldrums: Reflections After the 
BWC Fifth Review Conference, in: Disarmament Diplomacy 70, 11-18. 
Sims, Nicholas A. 2006a: Strengthening Structures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention: Options for Remedying the Institutional Deficit, in: Disarmament Forum 3/2006, 17-
26. 
Sims, Nicholas A. 2006b: Towards the BWC Review Conference: Diplomacy Still in the Doldrums, 
in: Disarmament Diplomacy 82, 8-16. 
Sims, Nicholas A. 2007: The Future of Biological Disarmament: New Hope After the Sixth Review 
Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, in: The Nonproliferation Review 14: 2, 351-
372.  
SIPRI 1973: The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare. Vol. III: CBW and the Law of War. 
Stockholm. 
40 Una Becker 
 
 
Smithson, Amy 2004: Biological Weapons: Can Fear Overwhelm Inaction? in: The Washington 
Quarterly 28: 1, 165-178.  
Tokyo Seminar 2006: “Future Measures for Strengthening the BWC Regime”, Summary of 
Discussions, BWC Tokyo Seminar, 14-15 February, 2006, Tokyo, Japan, 
(http://www.bwc06.org/resources/200602_bwpp_tokyoseminar_summary.pdf; 20.06.2007). 
Tucker, Jonathan B. (ed.) 2000: Toxic Terror. Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons, Cambridge, MA/London. 
Tucker, Jonathan B./Zilinskas, Raymond A. 2002: Assessing U.S. Proposals to Strengthen the 
Biological Weapons Convention, in: Arms Control Today 32: 3, 10-14.  
Tucker, Jonathan B. 2004: The BWC New Process. A Preliminary Assessment, in: The 
Nonproliferation Review 11: 1, 26-39. 
VERTIC 2006: A New Strategy: Strengthening the Biological Weapons Regime Through Modular 
Mechanisms, Verification Matters, VERTIC Research Reports No. 6, October 2006. 
Ward, Kenneth 2004: The BWC Protocol: Mandate for Failure, in: The Nonproliferation Review 11: 
2, 1-17.  
Wenger, Andreas/Wollenmann, Reto (eds.) 2007: Bioterrorism. Confronting a Complex Threat. 
Boulder, CO. 
Wheelis, Mark 2002: Biotechnology and Biochemical Weapons, in: The Nonproliferation Review 9: 
1, 48-53. 
Wheelis, Mark/Rosza, Lajos/Dando, Malcolm (eds) 2006: Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 
1945, Cambridge, MA. 
WMD Commission 2006: Final Report: Weapons of Terror. Freeing the World of Nuclear, 
Biological and Chemical Arms, Stockholm, Sweden, 1 June 2006 
(http://www.wmdcommission.org; 20.06.2007). 
Woodward, Angela 2003: Time to Lay Down the Law. National Legislation to Enforce the BWC, 
London: VERTIC (http://www.vertic.org/assets/Time%20to%20lay%20down%20the%20law%20-
%20final%20report.pdf; 20.06.2007). 
Woodward, Angela 2004: BW: Revisiting the UN Mechanism, in: Trust & Verify 116, 3-4. 
Zanders, Jean-Pascal/Hart, John/Kuhlau, Frida 2002: Chemical and Biological Weapon 
Development and Arms Control, in: SIPRI Yearbook 2002, Oxford et al., 665-683. 
Zanders, Jean-Pascal 2003: International Norms Against Chemical and Biological Warfare: An 
Ambiguous Legacy, in: Journal of Conflict & Security Law 8: 2, 391-410. 
Zilinskas, Raymond A. 1999: Cuban Allegations of Biological Warfare by the United States: 
Assessing the Evidence, in: Critical Reviews in Microbiology 25: 3, 173-227. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Light at the End of the Tunnel? 41
 
 
Abbreviations 
AHG  Ad Hoc Group 
BWC  Biological Weapons Convention 
CBMs  Confidence-Building Measures 
CWC  Chemical Weapons Convention 
DDA  (UN) Department for Disarmament Affairs (until March 2007) 
EU  European Union 
ISU  Implementation Support Unit 
JACKSNNZ Japan, Australia, South Korea, Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand 
NAM  Non-Aligned Movement 
NGOs  Non-Governmental Organisations 
NPT  Non-Proliferation Treaty 
ODA  (UN) Office for Disarmament Affairs (since March 2007) 
PrepCom Preparatory Committee 
UN  United Nations 
WEOG  Group of Western and Other States 
 
